Montagnes

Fr. Hills, mountains, . In a military sense, the term is peculiarly applicable to that species of warfare which is carried on in a mountainous and intersected country. We have already given a general outline of this species of warfare under the head Guerre de Montagne: neverthele the following observations may not appear superfluous or irrelevant in this place. The chevalier Folard has written largely, and with no inconsiderable degree of method, on that part of a war among hills, . where an army might run the risk of being surrounded, or shut up. He observes, that a body of men may be drawn into snares by the well concerted movements of an able and active enemy, most especially in a country which is intersected by rivers, and occasionally broken with hills and eminences. Although disasters of this sort are manifest proofs of a want of ability in the person who holds the chief command, they become infinitely more disgraceful when a general runs headlong into a snare, as Euripi das did, without having sufficient courage to attempt a daring enter prize; for it certainly remains with ourselves to determine, whether we chuse to move into an impracticable country; and it equally rests with us to avoid stratagems and snares. All this, however, depends upon a knowlege of the country into which the war is carried; and as it is impo ible to be in po e ion of the requisite information without some extraneous means, every general ought to lay it down as a maxim, not to advance into a mountainous country without having a good number of intelligent and faithful guides. These, in addition to some able topographers, will prevent the po ibility of being surprised, and make him thoroughly master of all the pa es, . It is not, however, sufficient to be in po e ion of the heights that immediately command a valley into which an army has moved; in proportion as you advance, you must be certain, that the enemy who retreats before, is not insensibly winding round a second range of hills, to get upon your flanks, or ultimately fall upon your rear. It moreover frequently happens, that some vallies have not any outlets, and that others become so narrow, that an army is under the nece ity of marching by single files, in order to reach a more open piece of ground, or to get at some important pa for the purpose of intercepting or obstructing the march of an enemy. When it is found nece ary to retreat, or to march over a country, as Hannibal did over the Alps, it is of little consequence what steps or measures you take, with regard to those parts which you are abandoning; but when you advance against an enemy, and are determined to dispute his march through a valley or hollow way, you must adopt every precaution to secure your rear and flanks, lest, as we have already observed, your antagonist should take advantage of the various pa es and intricate bye-ways, which always exists in a mountainous country; and it must always be remembered, that many coups de main, and daring enterprises, may be undertaken by four or five hundred active partisans, which an army would find impracticable. An able general cannot have a better, or more favorable field to exercise his military genius in, than that which is afforded by a mountainous country. All the chicane and stratagem of war may be resorted to; and however weak an army might be, yet such are the manifold resources of this peculiar kind of contest, that there is scarcely any thing which may not be attempted, provided the officer, who commands, has a thorough knowlege of the country, is fertile in expedients, and has a calm determined mind. Many instances might be adduced to illustrate these observations; we shall be satisfied with stating, that the prince of Conti, in the campaign of 1744, which he so ably conducted, owes a considerable part of his reputation to the scope afforded to his talents by the locality of Piedmont. This country, indeed, as well as Switzerland, seems to have been cut out as the peculiar theatre of great military talents. But neither the prince of Conti, nor the first consul of France, Bonaparte, would have succeeded in the brilliant manner, which they most unquestionably have done, had not the science of topography seconded the natural advantages of that mountainous part of Europe. Ma ena, Lecourbe, Ney, Lefebvre, Soult, and Mac donald have immortalized themselves in mountain warfare.