def In1tion

[Lat. definitio, from definio = to limit, to define; Fr. définition; Ital. definizione; Sp. def in i cion.] I. Ordinary Language: 1. The act or proce of defining or describing anything by its qualities and circumstances. 2. A brief description or explanation of anything of a word or term. by its qualities and circumstances; an explanation "The def in i tich of the crime, the amount of the penalty, remained unaltered." - Macaulay: Hist. Eng ., ch. xvi. II. Technically : 1. Logic : Archbishop Whately regards a definition as being an expre ion explanatory of that which is defined, i. e., separated as by a boundary from everything else; an expre ion which explains any term so as to separate it from everything else. John Stuart Mill states that the simplest and most correct notion of a definition is a proposition declaratory of the meaning of a word-namely, either the meaning which it bears in common acceptation. or that which the speaker or writer, for the particular purpose of his discourse, intends to annex to it. (J. S. Mill : Logic , bk. i., ch. viii.) According to Whately, definitions are divided into those which are e ential and those which are accidental. An e ential definition states what are regarded as the constituent parts of the e ence of that which is to be defined, while an accidental definition is one which lays down what are regarded as circumstances belonging to it-viz., as properties or accidents, such as causes, effects, . Accidents in the narrowest sense cannot be employed in a description-i. e., in an accidental definition of any species, while not properties but accidents generally of the kind called in separable are used in discriminating an individual. An e ential definition is divided into a physical--i. e., a natural-and a logical-i.e.. a metaphysical-definition. [(4).] Another division is into nominal and real definitions. [ (6) & (8).] To be perfect a definition should be (1) adequate-i, e., neither too extensive nor too narrow; (2) it should be plainer than that which it is intended to explain; and (3) it should be couched in a convenient number of appropriate words. ( Whately : Logic , bk. ii., ch. v., § 6.) 2. Nat. Science: Linnæus, in his System a Naturæ , defined the species under each genus, not by describing their whole characters, but by stating only, and in the fewest po ible words, the point or points discriminating them from the other known species of the same genus. That system is now used chiefly, if not exclusively, in analytical tables. Discriminating characters are not enough, unle one is sure that all the species of the genus existing, or that ever have existed, are before him; else his distinct ive characters will fail to identify the species. If, for instance, there was in Linnæus' time a genus of plants with two known species, one with ovate and one with lanceolate leaves, Foliis ovatis and Foliis lan ceo lat is would have been enough to dis. criminate them. But perhaps by this time the two species have been raised by fresh discovery to twenty, thirteen of them with ovate leaves and seven with lanceolate ones, in which case the Linnean characters are not enough to discriminate them. Lengthened definitions are consequently now given, all the e ential characters being enumerated instead of simply one or two. The Linnæan method employs the metaphysical definition [(4)], that which superseded it is the physical definition IMG:content-2031.png:[ocr errors][merged small][merged small] definite peace, s. Hist .: The name given to the treaty signed at Paris. September 3, 1783, by which Great Britain acknowledged the independence of the United States. ( Town send .)