Intelligence

in a military sense may be variously applied, and of course has different significations. No general can be said to be in any degree qualified for the important situation which he holds, unle , like an able minister of state, he be constantly prepared with the requisite means to obtain the best intelligence respecting the movements and the designs of the enemy he is to oppose. On the other hand, it is not po ible to conceive a greater crime than that of affording intelligence to an enemy, and thereby bringing about the overthrow and destruction of a whole army. A French military writer, (to whose work we have the satisfaction of being frequently indebted for much general and useful knowlege) makes the following observations respecting the latter species of intelligence, which he cla es under two specific heads. He justly remarks, that to hold correspondence, or to be in intelligence with an enemy, ( étre d’intelligence avec l’Ennemi ) is to betray your country. Armies and fortified places are almost always surprized and taken by means of a secret intelligence, which the enemy keeps up with domestic traitors, acting in conjunction with commi ioned spies and delegated hirelings. Arnold had nearly effected the destruction of the American army by the intelligence which he kept up through the British major André, with the British. A garrison town may be taken by surprize, under the influence of secret intelligence, in two different ways. The one is when the a ailant to whom the place has been surrendered, is not bound to join his forces to those troops by whom he has been admitted; the other when it is nece ary, that an a ault should be made by openly storming, by throwing shells and petards, or by stratagem. The first species of intelligence may be held with a governor who has influence enough to direct the will and actions of the garrison; with a garrison which is indisposed towards the governor and the officers that command the troops; with the inhabitants who have undertaken to defend a place where no garrison is stationed, and lastly with the prevailing faction, where there are two parties that govern in a free town. The other species of intelligence may be practised with a governor who either wants power, or is afraid to tamper with the fidelity of the garrison; with some particular officer, serjeants, or soldiers; with the body of inhabitants who think differently from the armed force that overawes them, or with active and shrewd individuals, who have acce to the ruling party, and can skilfully combine affected loyalty with secret disaffection. There is not, however, in human nature perhaps a more insidious, or a more dangerous ground to tread on than that of secret intelligence; nor are the faculties of the mind ever so much put to the test, as when it is nece ary to listen to the report of an individual, who whilst he is betraying one side, may be equally disposed to dupe the other. A wise general will consequently hear every thing, and say nothing; and a wise man, let his secret wishes be what they may, will warily consider, whether the person who insinuates to him even the po ibilities of a plot, does not at that instant endeavor to get into his confidence, for the sole purpose of acting contrary to his supposed views, and of betraying the man who has unfolded other schemes. It is certainly justifiable policy, either in the governor of a town or in a general, to affect to give into the views of any man or party of men whom he has cause to suspect, and whose ultimate object he is determined to defeat. But he should be equally cautious, how he listens to the communications of spies or informers. The veil of honesty is often a umed to cover a deep-laid scheme of villainy; and apparent candor is the surest path to unguarded confidence. When villains voluntarily unfold themselves in such a manner as to convince an able and penetrating officer, that their treachery can be depended upon, much blood may be spared by making a proper use of their intelligence. This axiom has prevailed in every civilized country; and should be well attended to by thinking men. For when a battle has been gained, it avails little to ask, whether the enemy owed his succe to force or treachery? No treachery, however, is admi ible, or should be sanctioned by belligerent powers, which militates against those laws of nations which are founded upon the wise basis of humanity. Private a a inations , the use of poison , or the disregard of paroles of honor , must be generally reprobated: and whatever general obtains his ends by any of these dark means, his name should be stamped with infamy, and himself exposed to all the melancholy casualties of retaliation.