ESSENES

or ESSENIANS, one of the three ancient sects of the Jews. They appear to have been an enthusiastic sect, never numerous, and but little known; directly opposite to the Pharisees with respect to their reliance upon tradition, and their scrupulous regard to the ceremonial law, but pretending, like them, to superior sanctity of manners. They existed in the time of our Saviour; and though they are not mentioned in the New Testament, they are supposed to be alluded to by St. Paul in his Epistles to the Ephesians and Colo i ans, and in his first Epistle to Timothy. From the account given of the doctrines and institutions of this sect by Philo and Joseph us, we learn that they believed in the immortality of the soul; that they were absolute predestinarians; that they observed the seventh day with peculiar strictne ; that they held the Scriptures in the highest reverence, but considered them as mystic writings, and expounded them allegorically; that they sent gifts to the temple, but offered no sacrifices; that they admitted no one into their society till after a probation of three years; that they lived in a state of perfect equality, except that they paid respect to the aged, and to their priests; that they considered all secular employment as unlawful, except that of agriculture; that they had all things in common, and were industrious, quiet, and free from every species of vice; that they held celibacy and solitude in high esteem; that they allowed no change of raiment till nece ity required it; that they abstained from wine; that they were not permitted to eat but with their own sect; and that a certain portion of food was allotted to each person, of which they partook together, after solemn ablutions. The austere and retired life of the E enes is supposed to have given rise to monkish superstition. The Therapeutæ were a distinct branch of the E enes. Jahn has thus described the difference between them: The principal ground of difference between the E enes or E aëi, and Therapeutæ consisted in this; the former were Jews, who spoke the Aramean; the latter were Greek Jews, as the names themselves intimate, namely, אסיא and Θεραπευταὶ. The E enes lived chiefly in Palestine; the Therapeutæ, in Egypt. The Therapeutæ were more rigid than the E enes, since the latter, although they made it a practice to keep at a distance from large cities, lived, neverthele , in towns and villages, and practised agriculture and the arts, with the exception of those arts which were made more directly subservient to the purposes of war. The Therapeutæ, on the contrary, fled from all inhabited places, dwelt in fields and deserts and gardens, and gave themselves up to contemplation. Both the E enes and the Therapeutæ held their property in common, and those things which they stood in need of for the support and the comforts of life, were distributed to them from the common stock. The candidates for admi ion among the E enes gave their property to the society; but those who were destined for a membership with the Therapeutæ, left theirs to their friends; and both, after a number of years of probation, made a profe ion which bound them to the exercise of the strictest uprightne . The Romanists pretend, as Dr. Prideaux observes, without any foundation, that the E enes were Christian monks, formed into a society by St. Mark, who founded the first church at Alexandria. But it is evident, from the accounts of Joseph us and Philo, that the E enes were not Christians, but Jews. Dr. Neander’s account of the E enes is as follows:--A company of pious men, much experienced in the trials of the outward and of the inward life, had withdrawn themselves out of the strife of theological and political parties, at first apparently (according to Pliny the elder) to the western side of the Dead Sea; where they lived together in intimate connection, partly in the same sort of society as the monks of later days, and partly as mystical orders in all periods have done. From this society, other smaller ones afterward proceeded, and spread themselves over all Palestine. They were called E enes, Ἐσσηνοὶ or Ἐσσαιοὶ. They employed themselves in the arts of peace, agriculture, pasture, handicraft works, and especially in the art of healing, while they took great delight in investigating the healing powers of nature. It is probable, also, that they imagined themselves under the guidance of a supernatural illumination in their search into nature, and their use of her powers. Their natural knowledge, and their art of healing, appear also to have had a religious, theosophic character, as they profe ed also to have peculiar prophetical gifts. The E enes were, no doubt, distinguished from the ma of ordinary Jews by this, that they knew and loved something higher than the outward ceremonial and a dead faith, that they did really strive after holine of heart, and inward communion with God. Their quiet, pious habits also rendered them remarkable, and by means of these they remained quiet amidst all the political changes, respected by all parties, even by the Heathens; and by their laborious habits and kindne , their obedience toward the higher powers, as ordained of God, their fidelity and love of truth, they were enabled to extend themselves in all directions. In their society every yea and nay had the force of an oath; for every oath, said they, pre-supposes a mutual distrust, which ought not to be the case among a society of honest men. Only in one case was an oath suffered among them, namely, as a pledge for those who after a three years’ noviciate were to be received into the number of the initiated. According to the portraiture of them, given by Philo, the Alexandrian, in his separate treatise concerning the “True Freedom of the Virtuous,” we should take the E enes for men of an entirely practical religious turn, far removed from all theosophy and all idle speculation; and we should ascribe to them an inward religious habit of mind, free from all mixture of superstition and reliance on outward things. But the account of Philo does not at all accord with that of Joseph us; and the more historical Joseph us deserves in general more credit than Philo, who was too apt to indulge in philosophizing and idealism. Beside, Joseph us had more opportunity of knowing this sect thoroughly, than Philo; for Philo lived in Egypt, and the E enes did not extend beyond Palestine. Joseph us had here pa ed the greater part of his life, and had certainly taken all nece ary pains to inform himself accurately of the nature of the different sects, among which he was determined, as a youth of sixteen years of age, to make choice, although he can hardly have completely pa ed through a noviciate in the sect of the E enes, because he made the round of all the three Jewish sects, in a period of from three to four years. Joseph us, also, shows himself completely unprejudiced in this description; while Philo, on the contrary, wished to represent the E enes to the more cultivated Greeks as models of practical wisdom, and, therefore, he allowed himself to represent much, not as it really was, but as it suited his purpose. We must conclude that the E enes did also busy themselves with theosophy, and pretended to impart to those of their order disclosures relating to the supernatural world of spirits, because those who were about to be initiated, were obliged to swear that they would never make known to any one the names of the angels then to be communicated to them. The manner in which they kept secret the ancient books of their sect is also a proof of this. And, indeed, Philo himself makes it probable, when he says, that they employed themselves with a φιλοσοφία διά συμβολῶν, a philosophy which was supported by an allegorical interpretation of Scripture, for this kind of allegorizing interpretation was usually the accompaniment of a certain speculative system. According to Philo, they rejected the sacrifice of victims, because they considered, that to consecrate and offer up themselves wholly to God, was the only true sacrifice, the only sacrifice worthy of God. But according to Joseph us they certainly considered sacrifice as something peculiarly holy, but they thought that from its peculiar holine it must have been desecrated by the profane Jews in the temple of Jerusalem, and that it could be worthily celebrated only in their holy community, just as mystic sects of this nature are constantly accustomed to make the objective acts of religion dependent on the subjective condition of those who perform or take part in them. In the troublesome and superstitious observance of the rest of the Sabbath, according to the letter, and not according to the spirit, they went even farther than the other Jews, only with this difference, that they were in good earnest in the matter, while the Pharisees by their casuistry relaxed their rules, or drew them tighter, just as it suited their purpose. The E enes, not only strenuously abhorred, like the other Jews, contact with the uncircumcised, but, having divided themselves into four cla es, the E enes of a higher grade were averse from contact with those of a lower, as if they were rendered unclean by it, and when any thing of this kind did happen, they purified themselves after it. Like many other Jews, they attributed great value, in general, to lustration by bathing in cold water. To their ascetic notions, the constant and healthy practice in the east of anointing with oil seemed unholy, and if it befel any one of them, he was obliged to purify himself. It was also a great abomination to them to eat any food except such as had been prepared by persons of their own sect. They would die rather than eat of any other. This is a sufficient proof that although the E enes might po e a certain inward religious life, and a certain practical piety, yet that these qualities with them, as well as with many other mystical sects, as for example, those of the middle ages, were connected with a theosophy, which desired to know things hidden from human reason, ἐμβατευειν εἰς ἁ τις μη ἑωρακεν, and therefore lost itself in idle imaginations and dreams, and were also mixed up with an outward asceticism, a proud spirit of separation from the rest of mankind, and superstitious observances and demeanours totally at variance with the true spirit of inward religion. A Biblical and Theological Dictionary, by Richard Watson ESTHER. The book of Esther is so called, because it contains the history of Esther a Jewish captive, who by her remarkable accomplishments gained the affection of King Ahasuerus, and by marriage with him was raised to the throne of Persia; and it relates the origin and ceremonies of the feast of Purim, instituted in commemoration of the great deliverance, which she, by her interest, procured for the Jews, whose general destruction had been concerted by the offended pride of Haman. There is great diversity of opinion concerning the author of this book; it has been ascribed to Ezra, to Mordecai, to Joachim, and to the joint labours of the great synagogue; and it is impo ible to decide which of these opinions is the most probable. We are told, that the facts here recorded happened in the reign of Ahasuerus king of Persia, “who reigned from India even unto Ethiopia, over a hundred and twenty-seven provinces,” Esther i, 1; and this extent of dominion plainly proves that he was one of the succe ors of Cyrus. That point is indeed allowed by all; but learned men differ concerning the person meant by Ahasuerus, whose name does not occur in profane history; and consequently they are not agreed concerning the precise period to which we are to a ign this history. Archbishop Usher supposed, that by Ahasuerus was meant Darius Hystaspes, and Joseph Scaliger contended that Xerxes was meant; but Dean Prideaux has very satisfactorily shown, that by Ahasuerus we are to understand Artaxerxes Long i man us. Joseph us also considered Ahasuerus and Artaxerxes as the same person; and we may observe, that Ahasuerus is always translated Artaxerxes in the Septuagint version; and he is called by that name in the apocryphal part of the book of Esther. See Ecbatana , and Ahasuerus . ETERNITY is an attribute of God. (See God .) The self-existent being, says the learned Dr. Clarke, must of nece ity be eternal. The ideas of eternity and self-existence are so closely connected, that because something must of nece ity be eternal, independently and without any outward cause of its being, therefore it must nece arily be self-existent; and because it is impo ible but something must be self-existent, therefore it is nece ary that it must likewise be eternal. To be self-existent, is to exist by an absolute nece ity in the nature of the thing itself. Now this nece ity being absolute, and not depending upon any thing external, must be always unalterably the same; nothing being alterable but what is capable of being affected by somewhat without itself. That being therefore which has no other cause of its existence but the absolute nece ity of its own nature, must of nece ity have existed from everlasting, without beginning; and must of nece ity exist to everlasting, without end. On the eternal duration of the divine Being, many have held a metaphysical refinement. “The eternal existence of God,” it is said, “is not to be considered as succe ive; the ideas we gain from time are not to be allowed in our conceptions of his duration. As he fills all space with his immensity, he fills all duration with his eternity; and with him eternity is nunc stans , a permanent now , incapable of the relations of past, present, and future.” Such, certainly, is not the view given us of this mysterious subject in the Scriptures; and if it should be said that they speak popularly, and are accommodated to the infirmity of the reason of the body of mankind, we may reply, that philosophy has not, with all its boasting of superior light, carried our views on this attribute of the divine nature at all beyond revelation; and, in attempting it, has only obscured the conceptions of its admirers. “Filling duration with his eternity,” is a phrase without any meaning: for how can any man conceive a permanent instant, which coëxists with a perpetually flowing duration? One might as well apprehend a mathematical point coëxtended with a line, a surface, and all dimensions. As this notion has, however, been made the basis of some theological opinions, it may be proper to examine it. 2. Whether we get our idea of time from the motion of bodies without us, or from the consciousne of the succe ion of our own ideas, or both, is not important to this inquiry. Time, in our conceptions, is divisible. The artificial divisions are years, months, days, minutes, seconds, . We can conceive of yet smaller portions of duration; and, whether we have given to them artificial names or not, we can conceive no otherwise of duration, than continuance of being, estimated as to degree, by this artificial admeasurement, and therefore as substantially answering to it. It is not denied but that duration is something distinct from these its artificial measures; yet of this every man’s consciousne will a ure him, that we can form no idea of duration except in this succe ive manner. But we are told that the eternity of God is a fixed eternal now , from which all ideas of succe ion, of past and future, are to be excluded; and we are called upon to conceive of eternal duration without reference to past or future, and to the exclusion of the idea of that flow under which we conceive of time. The proper abstract idea of duration is, however, simple continuance of being, without any reference to the exact degree or extent of it, because in no other way can it be equally applicable to all the substances of which it is the attribute. It may be finite or infinite, momentary or eternal; but that depends upon the substance of which it is the quality, and not upon its own nature. Our own observation and experience teach us how to apply it to ourselves. As to us, duration is dependent and finite; as to God, it is infinite; but in both cases the originality or dependence, the finitene or infinity of it, arises, not out of the nature of duration itself, but out of other qualities of the subjects respectively. 3. Duration, then, as applied to God, is no more than an extension of the idea as applied to ourselves; and to exhort us to conceive of it as something e entially different, is to require us to conceive what is inconceivable. It is to demand of us to think without ideas. Duration is continuance of existence; continuance of existence is capable of being longer or shorter; and hence nece arily arises the idea of the succe ion of the minutest points of duration into which we can conceive it divided. Beyond this the mind cannot go, it forms the idea of duration no other way: and if what we call duration be any thing different from this in God, it is not duration, properly so called, according to human ideas; it is something else, for which there is no name among men, because there is no idea, and therefore it is impo ible to reason about it. As long as meta-physicians use the term, they must take the idea: if they spurn the idea, they have no right to the term, and ought at once to confe that they can go no farther. Dr. Cudworth defines infinity of duration to be nothing else but perfection, as including in it nece ary existence and immutability. This, it is true, is as much a definition of the moon, as of infinity of duration; but it is valuable, as it shows that, in the view of this great man, though an advocate of the nunc stans , “the standing now,” of eternity, we must abandon the term duration , if we give up the only idea under which it can be conceived. 4. It follows from this, therefore, that either we must apply the term duration to the divine Being in the same sense in which we apply it to creatures, with the extension of the idea to a duration which has no bounds and limits; or blot it out of our creeds, as a word to which our minds, with all the aid they may derive from the labours of metaphysicians, can attach no meaning. The only objection to succe ive duration as applied to God, which has any plausibility, is, that it seems to imply change; but this wholly arises from confounding two very distinct things; succe ion in the duration, and change in the substance. Dr. Cudworth appears to have fallen into this error. He speaks of the duration of an imperfect nature, as sliding from the present to the future, expecting something of itself which is not yet in being; and of a perfect nature being e entially immutable, having a permanent and unchanging duration, never losing any thing of itself once present, nor yet running forward to meet something of itself which is not yet in being. Now, though this is a good description of a perfect and immutable nature, it is no description at all of an eternally-enduring nature. Duration implies no lo in the substance of any being, nor addition to it. A perfect nature never loses any thing of itself, nor expects more of itself than is po e ed; but this does not arise from the attribute of its duration, however that attribute may be conceived of, but from its perfection and consequent immutability. These attributes do not flow from the duration, but the continuance of the duration from them. The argument is clearly good for nothing, unle it could be proved that succe ive duration nece arily implies a change in the nature; but that is contradicted by the experience of finite beings,--their natures are not at all determined by their duration, but their duration by their natures; and they exist for a moment, or for ages, according to the nature which their Maker has impre ed upon them. If it be said that, at least, succe ive duration imports that a being loses past duration, and expects the arrival of future existence, we reply, that this is no imperfection at all. Even finite creatures do not feel it to be an imperfection to have existed, and to look for continued and interminable being. It is true, with the past we lose knowledge and pleasure; and expecting in all future periods increase of knowledge and happine , we are reminded by that of our present imperfection; but this imperfection does not arise from our succe ive and flowing duration, and we never refer it to that. It is not the past which takes away our knowledge and pleasure; nor future duration, simply considered, which will confer the increase of both. Our imperfections arise out of the e ential nature of our being, not out of the manner in which our being is continued. It is not the flow of our duration, but the flow of our nature, which produces these effects. On the contrary, we think that the idea of our succe ive duration, that is of continuance, is an advantage, and not a defect. Let all ideas of continuance be banished from the mind, let there be to us a nunc semper stans , during the whole of our being, and we appear to gain nothing,--our pleasures surely are not diminished by the idea of succe ive duration being added to present enjoyment: that they have been, and still remain, and will continue, on the contrary, greatly heightens them. Without the idea of a flowing duration, we could have no such measure of the continuance of our pleasures; and this we should consider an abatement of our happine . What is so obvious an excellency in the spirit of man, and in angelic natures, can never be thought an imperfection in God, when joined with a nature e entially perfect and immutable. 5. But it may be said, that “eternal duration, considered as succe ive, is only an artificial manner of measuring and conceiving of duration; and is no more eternal duration itself than minutes and moments, the artificial measures of time, are time itself.” Were this granted, the question would still be, whether there is any thing in duration considered generally, or in time considered specially, which corresponds to these artificial methods of measuring and conceiving of them. The ocean is measured by leagues; and the extension of the ocean, and the measure of it, are distinct; they, neverthele , answer to each other. Leagues are the nominal divisions of an extended surface; but there is a real extension, which answers to the artificial artificial conception and admeasurement of it. In like manner, days, and hours, and moments, are the measures of time: but there is either something in time which answers to these measures; or not only the measure, but the thing itself, is artificial--an imaginary creation. If any man will contend, that the period of duration which we call time is nothing, no farther dispute can be held with him; and he may be left to deny also the existence of matter, and to enjoy his philosophic revel in an ideal world. We apply the same argument to duration generally, whether finite or infinite. Minutes and moments, or smaller portions, for which we have no name, may be artificial things, adopted to aid our conceptions; but conceptions of what? Not of any thing standing still, but of something going on. Of duration we have no other conception; and if there be nothing in nature which answers to this conception, then is duration itself imaginary, and we discourse about nothing. If the duration of the divine Being admits not of past, present, and future, one of these two consequences must follow,--that no such attribute as that of eternity belongs to him,--or that there is no power in the human mind to conceive of it. In either case, the Scriptures are greatly impugned; for “He who was , and is , and is to come ,” is a revelation of the eternity of God, which is then in no sense true. It is not true, if used literally: and it is as little so, if the language be figurative; for the figure rests on no basis, it illustrates nothing, it misleads. It is, however, to be remembered, that the eternal, supreme cause, must of nece ity have such a perfect, independent, unchangeable comprehension of all things, that there can be no one point or instant of his eternal duration, wherein all things that are past, present, and to come, will not be as entirely known and represented to him in one single thought or view, and all things present and future be equally entirely in his power and direction; as if there was really no succe ion at all, but all things were actually present at once. 6. The Hebrew word for eternity is שלם . This is its proper sense; but, as Gesenius observes, as with us in common life, it is often used in an inaccurate or loose manner to expre a very long space of time. So it is applied to the Jewish priesthood; to the Mosaic ordinances; to the po e ion of the land of Canaan; to the hills and mountains; to the earth, . These must, however, be considered as exceptions to predominant and certain usage.