PERCEPTION

(Lat.) In Mental Philosophy, that power, act, or state of the mind, which has a conscious reference to external objects. Various theories of perception have arisen among philosophers, differing as this reference is supposed to be more or le immediate, or as the objects to which it refers are conceived to po e an independent reality or not. These theories are designated by the terms idealism and realism; which latter is subdivided into natural or positive, and relative or negative realism. The •est known system of idealism is that of Bishop Berkeley. See Idealism. According to the scheme of negative or relative realism, all that we can know of an object is the feeling which it excites in our minds. The cause of this feeling we nece arily judge to be something external to ourselves; but it is in itself we have DO means of knowing. This is the view adopted by the great majority of philosophers, from Plata and Aristotle down to Kant and Brown. Tin theory of natural realism is the one supported by Dr. Reid under the name of the common-sense system. This philosopher conceives the object in perception to be in some way immediately present to our consciousne ; its qualities ore not merely felt by us, hut discovered in it. We derive a certain sensation from the whitene or roundne of an object; but it is the object itself and not our minds that are white or round. This doctrine, which was also that of the ancient Stoics, and expre ed by them in nearly the same words as ttiose used by Reid (see Cicero, Acad. Quest.), is in tact rather a statement than an explanation of the problem.Ithas been recently supported with great acuteneu by a learoed writer in the F.ilnt. lirriiw. No. 113, to which we refer our renders for a full account of all po ible tiieoIK-rception. PERCH, in Land Measure, is the fortieth p:irt of a rood, or ei|iial to 30*, square yards. Perch is also sometimes used as a denomination of long measure, when it signifies the same thing as a rod or pole, being 5A yards, or 16£ [s. 931]