FREE-WILL

is the power po e ed by man to choose freely between two contradictory actions without being forced by any external agency or by nece ity to do so. It is the faculty of man to decide in the last resort between two opposing po ibilities, in spite of pre ure of exterior environment, and in spite of the internal contention of different motives. Man being conscious of this power, the partisans of the theory of free-will argue that as we feel so we know that we are masters of ourselves, and that the power to decide must nece arily be inherent in us. The theory of free-will thus supposes that man po e es genuine moral freedom, is able to determine the course of his thoughts and volitions and to decide which motives shall prevail in his mind. His decisions are determined neither by external nor internal compulsion, and are exempt from the principle of causation. For the human will can only be called really free if it is neither the result of an outside power nor the effect of man’s own nature or environment. This free volition is due to man’s self not entirely accounted for by character, motives, and circumstances. Moreover, the decision resulting from a really free-will cannot be foreseen or explained by anything except the will of man. The volition must therefore be somewhat spontaneous, that is, no one is able to predict with precision and infallibility the po ible decision to which a man may arrive; otherwise it would follow that the act of volition 580 FREE-WILL has been determined by causes inde pendent of the free-will of man. The opponents of the theory of freewill are called determinists, and the partisans of free-will may consequently be defined as indeterminists. The question of free-will ramifies into metaphysics, psychology, ethics, and theojogy, and is one of the few most important philosophical problems of all times. Alfred Fouillée rightly said that free-will or determinism is the philosophical question par excellence, and indeed all the questions dealing with human efforts and human duties must at one time or another take this problem into consideration. The whole fabric of legislature of crim i no log and penology, is differently affected, according to whether free-will is admitted or denied. Since time immemorial man believed that he po e ed a certain power to determine his actions. Vaguely he felt this power, but he only began to speculate on this question later on. To the ancient Greek philosophers the problem of free-will did not as yet present itself very clearly. The Eleatics, So crates, Plato, and Aristotle did not yet discu the problem in a way in which it is looked upon by modern philosophers. The Stoics were determinists, i.e. opponents of the theory of freewill, whilst Epicurus advocated the idea of free-will or indeterminism. lt was, however, with the advent of Christianity, that the problem of free will a umed a new aspect. The Schoolmen invented the term of liberum arbidrium and discu ed its extent and limits. Whilst the pagan philosophers, interested in the problem, paid particular attention to the contradiction which existed between human independence and the continuous chain of causes called by the Greeks ¢tuapuevy and by the Latins fatum (fate or destiny), Christianity was above all preoccupied with the contradiction existing between human free volition and divine omnipotence. Whilst again the Greek and Roman philosophers, the Fathers of the Church, the Schoolmen, and the Scholars of the Reformation based their arguments upon reason, modern philosophers and psychologists argue from the point of view of experimental psychology. On the one hand, it must be admitted that if the word morality is to have any meaning at all, man must be free and responsible for his acts; duty, obligation, remorse, and responsibility would otherwise become empty words. If man’s actions are determined by an external force, acting independently of him, he cannot be eld responsible for his actions. On the other hand, psychology teaches us that mental life is made up of a series s of mental phenomena. [Every state of mind stands in relation to some other phenomenon; in other words, the phenomena of inner life, like those of external nature, are explained by the law of cause and effect. A man is moved to act by certain motives, but these motives themselves are the result of certain external influences as modified by character, which, in its turn, is the result of previous acts, either of the individual or of his ancestors. ‘The vexed question of free-will is still a subject of controversy and a problem of the keenest interest. The rapid growth, however, of the sciences of physics, sociology, and biology, and especially of the theory of evolution which looks upon man as a mere link in the chain of casual development, tends to prove that the idea of freewill is a mere illusion.—BIBLIOGRAPHY: D. Stewart, Moral Philosophy; W. James, Principles of Psychology, and The Will to Believe; A Bain, The Emotions and the Will; Ladd, Psychology, Descriptive and Explanatory; J. Ward, The Realm of Ends; H. Bergson, Time and Free Will; Renouvier, Les Dilemmes de la métaphysique pure; EH. Boutroux, La Contingence des Wis de la nature.