UNITED STATES IN THE WORLD

WAR About 4,000,000 men served in the Army of the United States during the war (Apr. 6, 1917 to Nov. 11, 1918). The total number of men serving in the armed forces of the country, including the Army, the Navy, the Marine Corps, and the other services, amounted to 4,800,000. It was almost true that among each 100 American citizens 5 took up arms in defense of the country. The most difficult feature of the American undertaking was to be found in the concentration of the major part of the effort into a few months of the spring and summer of 1918. When the country entered the war it was not anticipated in America, or suggested by France and England, that the forces to be shipped overseas should even approximate in numbers those that were actually sent. It was not until the German drive was under way in March 1918, that the allies called upon America for the supreme effort that carried a million and a half soldiers to France in six months. When war was declared there were only 200,000 in the Army. ‘Two-thirds of these were Regulars and _ one-third National Guardsmen who had been called to Federal service for duty along the Mexican border. When the war ended this force had been increased to 20 Mee its size and 4,000,000 men had served. After the signing of the Armistice, demobilization of troops was begun immediately. More than 600,000 were discharged during December. Forces in this country were at once cut to the lowest point consistent with carrying on the storage of equipment and settlement of contracts, and the discharge of men returning from overseas. In spite of the time nece ary for return of overseas forces, demobilization was carried forward more rapidly in preportion to the number under arms than in any previous American war. More than half a million came in through the Regular Army. Almost 400,000 more, or nearly 10 per cent, entered through the National Guard. More than three-quarters of all came in through the selective service or National Army enlistments. Of every 100 men 10 were National Guardsmen, 13 were Regulars, and 77 belonged to the National Army, or would have if the services had not been consolidated and the distinctions wiped out on August 7, 1918. The willingne with which the American people accepted the universal drait was the most remarkable feature in the history of our preparation for war. It is noteworthy evidence of the enthusiastic support given by the country to the war program that, despite previous hostility to the principle of universal liability for military service, a few months after the selective service law was pa ed, the standing of the drafted soidier was fully as honorable in the estimation of his companions and of the country in general as was that of the man who enlisted voluntarily. Moreover, the record of desertions from the Army shows that the total was smaller than in previous wars and a smaller percentage occurred among drafted men than among those who volunteered. ‘The selective service law was pa ed on May 19, 1917, and as subsequently amended it mobilized all the men power of the Nation from the ages of 18 to 45, inclusive. Under this act, 24,234,021 men were registered and slightly more than 2,800,000. were inducted into the military service. All his was accomplished in a manner that was fair to the men, supplied the Army with soldiers as rapidly as they could be equipped and trained, and resulted in a minimum of disturbance to the industrial and economic life of the Nation. The first registration, June 5, 1917, covered the ages from 21 to 31. The second registration, one year later (June 5, 1918 and Aug. 24, 1918) included those who had become 21 years old since the first registration. The third registration (Sept. 12, 1918), extended the age limits downward to 18 and upward to 45. At the outbreak of the war, the total male population of the country was about 54,000,000. During the war some 26,000,000 of them, or nearly half of all, were either registered undev the selective-service act or were serving in ae ghas or Navy without being regisered. The experience of the Civil War furnished a basis for comparing the methods used and the results obtained in the two great struggles. This comparison is strikingly in favor of the methods used in the present war. During the Civil War large sums were paid in bounties in the hope that by this means recourse to the draft might be made unnece ary. This hope was frustrated and the draft was carried through by methods which were expensive and inefficient. This may be summed up by noting that dur-| ing the War with Germany we raised twice as many men as we raised durin & | the Civil War, and at one-twentieth of the cost. This does not mean one twentieth of the cost per man, but that 0 times as much money was actually spent by the Northern States in the Civil War in recruiting their armies as was spent for the same purpose by the United States in the War with Germany. In this war 60 per cent of all armed forces were secured by the draft as compared with 2 per cent in the case of the Civil War. In the fall of 1917 the first half million came in rapidly. During the winter the acce ions were relatively few, and those that did come in were largely used as replacements and for special services. In the spring of 1917 came the German drive and with it urgent calls from France for unlimited numbers of men. Then over a period of several months the numbers of new men brought into the service mounted into the hundreds of you sands, and reached their highest point in July, when 400,000 were inducted. During the succeeding months the numbers fell off considerably on account of the epidemic of influenza, and with November the inductions ceased entirely, due to the.unexpected ending of the war. Under the operation of the draft, registrants were given physical examinations by the local boards in order that those men who were not of sufficient physical soundne and vigor for military life might be sorted out. After those who were found to be qual- | ified for service had been sent to camp, they were given another examination by the Army surgeons and additional men were rejected because of defects which had not been discovered in the first examination. An attempt has been made to compute from the records of these two sets. of physical examinations data which will show how the men from the different States compared in their physical arth gene ¥ It is ‘noteworthy that the States which sent men of so high an order of physic a l condition that from 70 to 80 per cent of of them survived the two examinations and were accepted into the military service, Constitute about one-quarter of all and are mostly located in the Middle West. The group from which 65 to 69 per cent of the applica nts were accepted equal in numbers with the first, and most of them are contiguous to the first group either on the east or west. The third group makes still poorer records, H ere from 60 to 64 per cent of the young men pa ed the tests. Most of them of them were in the South and far West. Finall y there is a group of States, ine cludin g, like each of the other groups, » about one-qu arter of all, from which 50 to 59 per cent of the candidates were accept ed. They are found in the N ortheast and far West, especially in those portions of the West which have in recent years become popular as health resorts and so have attracted large numbers of physically subnormal people. In general, it is noteworthy that the best records are made by those States that are agricultural rather than industrial and where the numbers of recently arrived immigrants are not large. Conversely, most of the States making low records are preeminently manufacturing States and also have in their populations large numbers of recently arrived immigrants. Further analysis of the records of physical examinations shows that the country boys made better records than those from the cities; and white registrants better than the colored; and native-born better records than those of alien birth. These differences are so considerable that 100,000 country boys could furnish for the military service 4,790 more soldiers than would an equal number of city boys. Similarly, 100,000 whites would furnish 1,240 more soldiers than would an equal number of colored. Finally, 100,000 native-born would yield 3,500 more soldiers than would a like number of foreign-born. The importance of these differences may be appreciated by noting that 3,500 men is equivalent to an infantry regiment at full war strength. About 200,000 commi ioned officers were required for the Army. Of this number, le than 9,000 were in the Federai service at the beginning of the war. Of these, 5,791 were Regulars and 83,199 were officers of the National Guard in the Federal service. The figures show that of every six officers one had had previous military training in the Regular Army, the National Guard, or the ranks. Three received the training for their commi ions in the officers’ training camps. The other two went from civilian life into the Army with little or no military. training. In this last group the majority were physicians, a few of them were ministers, and most of the rest were men of special busine or technical equipment, who were taken into the supply services or staff corps. A summary of the results attained is shown in the table below, which gives ‘the number of soldiers (not including officers) furnished by each State, whether by volunteering in the Regular Army, coming in through the National Guard, or being inducted through the draft. Pennsylvania........- 297,891 Ohio..\... sce esccecce 200,293 ITORASe ho sle so abe we 6 00 161,065 Ma achusetts........ 132,610 Mi ouri..... Ate At a 128,544 98,211 85,506 80,169 W.. Virginia.....6.. ee 55,777 IMESSISSID PIS 2) clare a s.else 54,295 Si OaTOWNan severe ole ore é §3,482 Washington........ re 45,154 Montana........-. 36,293 Colorado....'.. 34,393 OPRCLONS ao sie es8 0s0 8 Se ile 30,116 Maine...... sl ehatecsiate ate 24,252 PO AUOR on ala rate ac cake we 19,016 Porto Rico..... Sak Rees 16,538 New Mexico.......... 12,439 Not all located........ 1,318 Philippines sis. ce 255 3,757,624 The number of men serving in the armed forces of the Nation during th ewar was (4,800,000, of whom 4,000,000 served in the Army. In the War with Germany the United States raised twice as many men as did the Northern States in the Civil War, but only half as many in proportion to the population. The British senu more men to France in their first year of war than we did in our first year, but it took England three years to reach a strength of 2,000,000 men in France, and the United States accomplished it in one-half of that time. Of every 100 men who served, 10 were National Guardsmen, 13 were Regulars, and 77 were in the National Army (or would have been if the services had not been consolidated). Of the 54,000,000 males in the population, 26,000,000 were registered in the draft or were already in service. In the physical examinations the States of the Middle West made the best showing. Country boys did better than city boys; whites better than colored; and native born better than foreign born. In this war twice as many men were recruited as in the Civil War and at one=- twentieth of the recruiting cost. There were 200,000 Army officers. Of every six officers, one had previous mnilitary training with troops, three were graduates of officers’ training camps and two came directly from civil life. American troops saw service on practically every stretch of the western front from British lines in Belgtum to inactive sectors in the Vosges. On October 21, 1917, Americans entered the line in the quiet Toul sector. From that date to the armistice American units were somewhere in line almost continuously. It is difficult to cut up the year and 22 days which intervened into well defined battles, for in a sense the entire war on the western front was a single battle. It is po ible, however, to distinguish certain major operations or phases of the greater struggle. Thirteen such operations have been recognized in which American units were engaged, of which 12 took place on the western front and one in Italy. The first major operation 1n which American troops were engaged was the Cambrai battle at the end of the campaign of 1917. Scattering medical and engineering detachments, service with the British, were present during the action but sustained no serious casualties, The campaign of 1918 opened with the Germans in po e ion of the offensive. In a series of five drives of unprecedented violence the imperial Great General Staff sought to break the allied line and end the war. These five drives took place in five succe ive months, beginning in March. Each drive was so timed as to take advantage of the light of the moon for that month. The first drive opened on March 21, on a 50-mile front acro the old battle field of the Somme. In 17 days of fighting the Germans advanced their lines beyond Noyon and Montdidier and were within 12 miles of the important railroad center of Amiens with its great stores of British supplies. In this battle, also known as the Picardy offensive approximately 2,200 American troops, serving with the British and French, were engaged. The attack upon Amiens had been but partially checked when the enemy struck again to the north in the Armentieres sector and advanced for 17 miles up the valley of the Lys. A small number of Americans, serving with the British, participated in the Lys defensive. For their next attack (May 27) the Germans selected the French front along the Chemin des Dames north of the Aisne. The line from Rheims to a little east of Noyon was forced back. So is sons fell, and on May 31 the enemy had reached the Marne Valley, down which he was advancing in the direction of Paris. At this critical moment our Second Division, together with elements of the Third and Twenty-eighth Divisfons were thrown into the line. By blocking the German advance at Chateau-Thierry, they rendered great a istance in stopping perhaps the most. dangerous of the German drives. The Second Division not only halted the enemy on its front but also recaptured | from him the strong tactical positions of Bouresches, Belleau Wood, and Vaux.. _ The enemy had by his offensive estab-. lished two salients threatening Paris. He now sought to convert them into. one by a fourth terrific blow delivered. on a front of 22 miles between Mont-. French Army resisted firmly and the’ attack was halted after an initial advance of about 6 miles. Throughout this operation (June 9-15), the extreme: left line of the salient was defended our First by Division. Even before the. drive began the division had demonstrate. ed the fighting qualities of our troops | by capturing and holding the town of Cantigny (May 28.) There followed a month of compare ative quiet, during which the enemy rea embled his forces for his fifth onslaught. On July 15 he attacked simultaneously on both sides of Rheims, the eastern corner of the salient he had created in the Aisne drive. To the east of the city he gained little. On the west he cro ed the Marne, but made slight progre . _ His path was everywhere blocked. In this battle 85,000 American troops were engaged—the Forty-s econd division to the extreme east in Champagne, and the Third and Twenty eighth to the west, near Chateau< Thierry. The turning point of the war had come. The great German offensives had been stopped. The initiative now pa ed from lLudendorff to. Marshal Foch, and a series of allied offensives began, destined to roll back the German armies beyond the French frontier. In this continuous allied offensive there may be distinguished six phases or major operations in which the American Expeditionary Forces took part. In four of the six operations the American troops engaged were acting in support of allied divisions and under the command of the generals of the Allies. The monent chosen by Marshal Foch for launching the first counter-offensive was July 18, when it was clear that the German Champagne-Marne drive had spent its force. The place chosen was the uncovered west flank of the German salient from the Aisne to the Marne. The First, Second, Third, Fourth, second, and Forty-second American Divisions, together with selected French troops, were employed. When the operation was completed (August 6) the salient had been flattened out and the allied line ran from So is sons to Rheims along the Vesle. Two days later the British struck at the Somme salient, initiating an offensive which, with occasional breathing spells, lasted to the date of the armistice. American participation in this operation was intermittent. From August 8 to 20 elements of the Thirty-third Divfsion, which had been brigaded for training with the Austral i ans, were in the line and took part in the capture of seventh and Thirtieth Divisions, who served throughout with the British, were brought over from the Ypres sector and used in company with Australian troops to break the Hindenburg line at the tunnel of the St. Quentin (Canal (Sept. 20-Oct. 20.). In the meantime simultaneous a aults were in progre at other points on the front. On August 18 General Mangin began the Oise-Aisne phase of the great allied offensive. Starting from the So is sons-Rheims line, along which they had come to rest August 6, the French armies advanced by succe ive stages to the Aisne, to Laon, and on November 11 were close ot the frontier. In the first stages of this advance they were a isted by the Twenty-eighth, American Divisions, but by September 15 all of these were withdrawn for the coming Meuse-Argonne offensive of the American Army. The day after the opening of the Oise-Aisne offensive the British launched the first of a series of attacks in the Ypres sector which continued with some interruptions to the time of the armistice and may be termed the ‘Ypres-Lys offensive.” Four American divisions at different times participated in this operation. The Twenty-seventh and Thirtieth were engaged in the recapture of Mount Kemmel August 31 to September 2. The Thirty-seventh and Ninety-first were withdrawn from the MeuseArgonne battle and dispatched to Belgium, where they took part in the last stages of the Ypres-Lys offensive (Oct. 31 to Nov. 11). _With the organization of the American First Army on August 10, under the personal command of Gen. Pershing, the history of the American Expeditionary Forces entered upon a new siage. The St Mihiel (Sept. 12-16) and MeuseArgonne (Sept. 26-Nov. 11) offensives were major operations planned and executed by American generals and American troops. In addition to the 12 operations above mentioned, American troops participated in the Battle of Vittorio-Veneto (Oct. 24 to Nov. 4), which ended in the rout of the Austrian Army. The first distinctly American offensive was the reduction of the St. Mihiel salient carried through from September 12 to Sept. 15, largely by American troops and wholly under the orders of the American commander in chief. The Americans were also aided by French and British air squadrons. The attack began at 5. a.m., after four hours of artillery preparation of great severity, and met with immediate succe . Before noon about half the distance between the bases of the salient had been covered and the next morning troops of the First and Twenty-sixth Divisions met at Vigneulles, cutting off the salient within. 24 hours from the beginning of the movement. Two comparisons between this operation and the Battle of Gettysburg emphasize the magnitude of the action. About 550,000 Americans were engaged at St. Mihiel; the Union forces at Gettysburg numbered approximately 100,000. St. Mihiel set a record for concentration of artillery fire by a four hour artillery preparation, consuming more than 1,000,000 rounds of ammunition. In three days at Gettysburg Union artillery fired 33,000 rounds. The St. Mihiel offensive cost only about 7,000 casualties, le than one third the Union lo es at Gettysburg. There were captured 16,000 prisoners and 443 guns. A dangerous enemy salient was reduced, and American commanders and troops demonstrated their ability to plan and execute a big American operation. The object of the Meuse-Argonne offensive, said General Pershing in his report of November 20, 1918, was ‘to draw the best, German divisions to our front and to consume them.’ This sentence expre es better than any long description not only the object but also the outcome of the battle. Every available American division was thrown against the enemy. Every available German division was thrown in to meet them. At the end of 47 days of continuous battle our divisions had consumed the German divisions. The goal of the American attack was the Sedan-Mezieres railroad, the main line of supply for the German forces on the major part of the western front. If this line were cut, a retirement on the whole front would be forced. ‘This; retirement would include, moreover, evacuation of the Briey iron fields, which the Germans had been using to great advantage to supplement their iron supply. The defense of the positions threatened was therefore of such importance as to warrant the most desperate measures for resistance. When the. engagement was evidently impending the commander of the German Fifth Army sent word to his forces, calling on them for unyielding resistance and pointing out that defeat in this engagement might mean disaster for the fatherland. On the first day, the 26th of September, and the next day or two after that, the lines were considerably advanced. Then the resistance became more stubborn. Hach side threw in more and more of its man power until there were no more reserves. Many German divisions went into action twice, and not a few three times, until, through lo es, they were far under strength. All through the month of October the attrition went on. Foot by foot American troops pushed back the best of the German divisions. On November 1 the last stage of the offensive began. The enemy power began to break. American troops forced their way to the east bank of the Meuse. Toward the north they made even more rapid progre , and in seven days reached the outskirts of Sedan and cut the Sedan-Mezieres railroad, making the German line untenable. In the meartime (Oct. 2 to 28) our Second and Thirty-sixth Divisons had been sent west to a ist the French - who were advancing in Champagne besides our drive in the Argonne. The liaison detachment between the two armies was for a time furnished by the Ninety-second Division. In some ways the Meuse-Argonne offers an interesting resemblance to the Battle of the Wilderne , fought from May 5 to 12, 1864, in the Civil War. Both were fought over a terrain covered with tangled woods and underbrush. The Wilderne was regarded as a long battle, marked by slow progre , against obstinate resistance with very heavy casualties. Here the similarity ends. The Meuse-Argonne lasted six times as long as the Battle of the Wilderne . Twelve times as many American troops were engaged as were on the Union side. They used in the action ten times ag many guns and fired about one hundred times as many rounds of artillery ammunition. The actual weight of the ammunition fired was greater than that used by the Union forces during the entire Civil War. Casualties were pernaps four times as heavy as among the Northern troops in the Battle of the Wilderne . The Battle of the Meuse-Argonne was beyond compare the greatest ever fought by American. troops, and there have been few, if any, greater battles in the history of the World. Following the armistice of November 11, a portion of the American army constituting the American Army of Occupation, advanced into Germany and took its position at Coblenz. Here | it remained in control of this portion of Germany until February, 1923. The | force, however, was greatly reduced until finally it numbered not more than 1,000 men. The return of the great bulk of the American forces was accomplished with great efficiency and with no disorders of any kind. The men quickly dispersed to their homes and within a few months there was little trace of the great army which had constituted the American Expeditionary Force. Ample provision was made for those who had been injured or suffered illne as a result of their services in the army. The War Risk Insurance which was instituted in lieu of pensions, was taken advantage of by a large tion prop or of the men in service. This insurance gave $10,009, payable in monthly installments, in the case of death. Hospital provisions were made ona large scale and opportunities were afforded for vocational education to those who were unable to resume their former employment. Over $300,000,000 expended was annually for all these purposes, Of every 100 American soldiers and sailors who took part in the war with Germany, 2 were killed or died of disease during the period of hostilities. In the Northern Army during the Civil War the number was about 10. Among the other great nations im this war, between 20 and 25 in each 160 called to the colors were killed or died, To carry the comparison still further, American lo es in this war were relatively one fifth as large as during the Civil War and le than one-tenth as large as in the ranks of the enemy or among the nations a ociated with us. For every man who was killed in battle, seven others were wounded, taken prisoner, or reported mi ing. The total battle casualties in the expeditionary forces are shown below. The number who died of wounds was only 6 per cent as large as the number who were wounded. ‘The hospital records show that about 85 per cent of the men sent to hospitals on account of injuries have been returned to duty. _ After half the wounded were reported as slightly wounded and many of them would not have been recorded as casualties in previous wars. Except for 297 who died all the prisoners shown in the table have now been returned. Killed in action.......... 34,180 Died of wounds......... 14,729 Total dead.....ccsecee 48,099 Wounded severely....... 80,130 Wounded slightly....... 110,544 Wounded, degree undetermined....... 39,400 Total wounded........ 230,074 Mi ing in action........ 2,913 Taken prisoner.......... 4,434 Grand total........... 286,330 The number of men reported as mi ing has been steadily reduced from a total of 22,724, exclusive of prisoners, to the figure 2,913 shown above. This reduction has gone on without clearing any case as dead, except on evidence establishing beyond doubt the fact of death. Only 22 per cent of those who were originally reported as mi ing in action have now been returned as dead. The work of the Central Records Office of the American Expeditionary Forces in clearing up the cases of men listed as mi ing has been more succe ful than that done in any of the other armies or in any previous great war. When the records were finally completed there were practically no American soldiers unaccounted for. The mi ing lists of the other nations ran into the hundreds of you sands. The total number of lives lost in both Army and Navy from the declaration of war to May 1, 1919, is 122,500. Deaths in the Army, including marines attached to it, were 112,432. About two-thirds of these deaths occurred overseas. There were 768 lost at sea, of which 381 are included under battle deaths, since their lo was the direct result of sub I marine activity. Almost exactly half the lo es were from disease. If the comparison between disease and battle lo es is limited to the expeditionary forces, battle lo es appear more than twice as large as deaths from disease. This is the first war in which the United States has been engaged that showed a lower death rate from disease than from battle. In previous wars insanitary conditions at camps and the ravages of epidemic diseases’ have resulted in disease deaths far in exce of the number killed on the battle field, In order to make a fair comparison the figures used are the numbers of death each year among each 1,000 troops. Since the time of the Mexican War 3 steady improvement has been made in the health of troops in war operations. The death rate from disease in the Mexican War was 110 per year in each each 1,000 men; in the Civil War this was reduced to 65; and in the Spanish War to 26; while the rate in the expeditionary forces in this war was 19. The battle rate of 53 for the overseas forces is higher than in any previous war. It is higher than in the Civil War because all of the fighting was concentrated in one year, while in the Civil War it stretched over foun years. The rates in this war for the total forces under arms both in the United States and France from the beginning of the war to May 1, 1919, were 13 for battle and 15 for disease. The monetary cost of the war to the United States was in exce of 33 billion dollars, which include a loan of over $10,000,000,000 to the Allies. See Dests, War. The money for these expenditures was raised largely through the flotation of bond i ues taken readily by the people. See Lismrry Bonps, There was also involved an expense of over $200,000,000 for the maintenance of the American Army of Occupation in Germany. This in theory was to be repaid by the German government. There were, besides the expenses defrayed by the government, immense sums raised for relief work for the great organizations including the Red Cro , Y.M.C.A., Jewish Welfare Board, Knights of Columbus, and other organizations. The amount of money raised in the United States for all purposes probably aggregated forty billion doljars. See Depts, War; FINANCIAL System, AMERICAN; TAXATION, and kindred subjects.