GERBIAN

ral ARMY ARarY FIRST BATTLE of THE MARNE September 94914 269 EUROPEAN WAR lowing day, though not without heavy ritish casualties, amounting to between 1,500 and 2,000, including 3 commanding officers. The 6th Division arrived from England at this stage, and joined its own 3rd Corps on the left. Further advance was stayed by the strength of the enemy’s entrenched positions, in which he now determined to make his stand. Here he was backed by an overpowering superiority in artillery which, with fierce counterattacks on the part of his infantry, gallantly repulsed though they were, caused such severe lo es that the British Commander-in-Chief was_ forced to a ume a defensive réle, while Maunoury, de Castelnau, and Fech each made stupendous efforts to break the enemy’s line and renew the war of movement and manceuvre on which Von Moltke their military principles had been based. All, however, ended in the same dreary deadlock of entrenchments. Failing to shift the enemy from these impregnable positions, Joffre endeavoured to outflank the German right wing, already threatened by Manunoury’s advance along the Oise. Two new French armies were formed from the reserves to extend the Allied left —the Seventh, entrusted to de Castelnau, whose Second Army was transferred to Dubail, and the Tenth, the command of which was given to Maud’huy. De Castelnau’s Seventh Army, though it failed to turn the enemy’s flank—the movement having been anticipated by him—succeeded in extending the pre ure of Maunoury’s left, which had swung round by the 20th until it ran north from Compiégne to west of La igny, and in building the first section of Jofire’s great besieging wall which, gradually extending from the Alps to the sea, becaine the impenetrable barrier between the enemy and his main objectives. The Allies’ line was continued by de Castelnau through Roye to Albert, and thence, by Maud’huy’s Tenth Army, threugh Arras to Lens. Von Moltke had now been superseded in the German Higher Command by Falkenhayn, who promptly countered Joffre’s new strategy by similar extensions of the German front, thus beginning the outflanking race destined only to end in stalemate on the coast. While extending their right the Germans made a strenuous effort to regain the initiative by a blow with the army group nominally commanded by the German Crown Prince on Sarrail’s flank on the Meuse. It was a blow aimed at Verdun and the whole of the Allied line, which it hoped to break through at this point and so take in the rear. Verdun, however, had been rendered impenetrable by miles of powerfully protected outer defences, and practically the only succe which fell to the Crown Prince on this occasion was the capture of the Camp-desRomains and St. Mihiel on the Meuse, thus creating the remarkable salient east of Verdun which was destined to remain until the Franco-American force flattened it out in the victorious advance of the Allies four years later. The German Crown Prince fared even worse a week later, when he attacked along the main road through the Argonne towards Verdun, only to be flung back. It was after this double failure that the Germans bombarded Rheims and shattered her noble cathedral. The crucial phase of the struggle in the West had shifted towards the coast _as the first battle of the Aisne died down on 28th Sept., and the campaigns began in Artois which led in due course to the flerce struggles for the Labyrinth, the Vimy Ridge, Lens and Loos. The extension of the French left placed the British army in an anomalous position. EvenbeforeJofire had begun to build his barrier in this direction the British Commander-in Chief had felt strongly that his proper sphere of action was on the Belgian frontier on the left flank of the French armies, for the two-fold purpose of defending the Channel ports and being in position to concert combined action with the British navy. He suggested this move to the north to Joffre on 29th Sept., pointing out its strategical advantages and the po ibility of doing so now that the position of his forca on the right bank of the Aisne had been thoroughly well entrenched. Joffre 270 EUROPEAN WAR agreed in principle to General French’s proposal, but postponed the movetment until 3rd Oct. Retreat from Antwerp. By this time the critical situation of the Belgian Army at Antwerp had become hopele , and the danger of a German descent on the Channel ports suddenly became acute. Since their retreat towards Antwerp after their evacuation of Bru els on 20th Aug., the Belgians had kept the Germans at bay by vigorous counter-attacks, and threatened their communications by sundry sorties from the fortre . These sorties and counter-attacks, calling for reinforcements at atime when every coldier was needed on the main fighting fronts, infuriated the Germans and led to the reign of terror which included the deliberate destruction of Louvain and similar outrages at Maiines, fermonde, and elsewhere. Having made his position secure on the Aisne, and brought up his heavy guns, the enemy began his bombardment of the outer forts cf Antwerp on 28th Sept. By the 3rd of Oct. the Belgians were endangered not only by the besieging army, but also by the ever lengthening German line which, having now been extended from La igny to Lille—only 38 miles from the sea— threatened to isolate the Belgian forces from the Franco-British armies. They accordingly decided that plans must be made at once to withdraw from Antwerp in the direction of Ghent, both to protect the coast-line and gain touch with the Allies. The British troops hurriedly sent to reinforce the Belgians—a brigade of Royal Marines ana part of the recently formed Naval Division—had no influence on the fate of the fortre , but helped in protecting the flight of the citizens and in the final retreat of the Belgian army. Some 1,500 of the Royal Naval Division were forced acro the Dutch frontier and interned, and about 890 were made prisoners. The remnants of the British force, and the bulk of the Belgian army, escaped westward, leaving the Germans on 9th Oct. in po e ion of the deserted city. A little more and the German commander (von Beseler) might have closed the gap beyond the Scheldt through which this retreat had been made. Luckily for the Allies, too, the German Higher Command failed, as Lord French long afterwards expre ed it, to gather the richer harvest which had been put within its grasp by the capture of Antwerp. There was then apparently no insuperabie obstacle to an immediate German advance on Dunkirk, Calais, and Boulogne, before the Allied troops eould arrive from the main theatres to prevent it. ‘‘As on the Marne, so at Antwerp, they were not prepared to seize the psychological moment and te play boldly for the great stake.’’ General French, who had been given no yoice in the Antwerp dispositions, was now in the midst of the British move from the Aisne front to the north, where he was to be reinforced by ths Tthinfantry and 3rdCayalry Divisions, which had been landed on the Belgian coast to defend Zeebrugge and Ostend under Rawlinscn’s command, and the Indian contingent, which had just arrived at Orleans under Wiilcoclcs. First Batile of Ypres. The two corp a under de Castelnau and de Maud’huy were now under the supreme command of General Foch, who had orders to control all the French armies cperating in the northern theatre, and was confident that it was still po ible to outfiank the Germans and bend them back behind the Scheldt. At the end of a fortnight the British army had been sue ce fully transported to the north from the Aisne—after succe fully holding the line of that river for twenty-five days against many ce perate efforts of the enemy to break through—and had taken up its position on the left of Maud’huy’s corps, the Allies’ line being extended thence into Flanders by the French 8th Corps (under d’Urbal), which had been calied up by Joffre to this end, as well as to help the sorely tried Belgians. Meantime the Germans, besides pre ing Maud’huy hard in front of Arras, and forcing his Territorials out of Lille, had driven the retreating Belgian army out of Houthulst Forest to the line of the Yser north of Ypres, whence it took refuge behind the Yser and completed the Allied line to the coast. Rawlinson’s 4th Corps, covering the retreat of the Belgian army, had hard fighting most of the way before it suceeeded in joining the main British army, the German forces from Antwerp concentrating westwards in ever in ere a sing numbers. By the 15th Capper’s 7th Division was east of Ypres, while Byng’s 3rd Cavalry Division, a day earlier, had connected up with Gough’s 2nd Cavalry Division in front of Kemmel and a isted in the capture of that position, again which proved of the utmost importance in the subsequent struggie for Ypres. Ailenby’s Cavalry Corps had greatly distinguished itself during the two previous days, driving the enemy back all the way in a magnificent sweep to the north and north-east. A brilliant series of advances by Pulteney’s 3rd Corps on 12—15th Oct., leading to the capture of Bailleul and Meteren, and the line Sailly-Nieppe, confirmed French in the belief which he shared with Foch that the enemy had exhausted his strength, and that the time was ripe for a strong oifensive 271 EUROPEAN WAR eastwards. The advance had scarcely been started, however, before reports arrived of a powerful offensive on the part of the Germans towards Ypres and the Yser. The power and weight of the enemy’s opposition on the British front increased each day. Armentiéres and the Bois Grenier were won by 15th Oct., but the failure of the 4th Corps in its advance on Menin was one of numerous indications that the Germans were being heavily reinforced. By the 21st all General French’s worst forebodings were realized by the certainty established that the small German force which had been operating between Ostend and Menin on the 18th had been increased by no fewer than four corps. This discovery, in the British Commander-in-Chief’s own words, “‘came like a veritable bolt from the blue.’”?” There was no longer any hope of continuing the offensive on the part of the comparatively weak British line, extended as it was on too long a front. It was a case of holding on now until relief arrived. The threat was twofold. Not only were the Germans ma ing in tremendous strength in the north; they were also seriously threatening the British right. Maud’huy, round Arras, was fighting a battle which, like that which the British were waging round Ypres, was one of the landmarks of the war. He sent word on the 16th that the enemy was intent on driving in a wedge between Ypres and La Ba ée —a threat which, had it matured, would have finally separated the Allies, and compelled the British either to surrender or be driven into the sea. Faced by this double threat, General French decided to risk the po ible disaster on his right, and concentrate against the German tide in the north, which otherwise must gain the seaboard, with po ibly fatal consequences to the whole British campaign. ¥ortunately the First Army under Haig had already been ordered in the direction best calculated to meet the new situation, though there was no longer any hope of its original orders —to turn the enemy’s flank and drive him back to Ghent—being carried out. In this first phase of the battle of Ypres, which lasted until the night of 26th Oct., the northern portion of the British line, notwithstanding the enemy’s immense reinforcements, progre ed slowly but surely, and took heavy toll in killed, wounded, and prisoners. A ecrtain amount of ground was lost to the south, between Zonnebeke and La Ba ée—the commanders of both the 2nd and 3rd Corps being anxious about their positions on more than one occasion—but at no point was any serious break made in the line. Maud’huy at the same time was gallantly keeping the enemy in check in the Arras region, though he could not drive him from Lens and the Vimy Ridge; while on the left the French and Belgians were withstanding repeated a aults on the swaying front between Dixmude and the sea. The line held, and was now more or le firmly established. The second phase of the battle of Ypres consisted in the repeated attempts of the Germans to break through this line at all costs. It began on 27th Oct., and lasted through five of the most momentous days in the history of the British army. On this day the French 9th Corps, which had been sent by Joffre to the a istance of the sorely tried British troops, took over the trenches in the northern part of the British salient. Capper’s 7th Division, exhausted by ince ant fighting and fearful lo es, was temporarily attached to Haig’s 1st Corps in the centre, and took over the ground south of the Ypres-Menin road. Byng’s 3rd Cavalry Division was at the same time placed under Allen by. The 4th Corps was thus temporarily broken up, Rawlinson being sent home to supervise the preparation of the 8th Division for France. The British line was further reduced in numbers during the opening days of this new phase of the battle by the repeated but unavailing attempt of the enemy to advance, the Germans meantime mounting up reserves of reinforcements for a decisive blow until, by the 30th, they outnumbered the battle-worn British by two to one. Then came the onslaught in full, almost overpowering strength. ‘‘ October31st and November Ist,”’ afterwards wrote the British Commander-in-Chief in his story of 1914, ‘‘ will remain for ever memorable in the history of our country, for during those two days, no more than one thin and straggling line of tired-out British soldiers stood between the Empire and its practical ruin as an independent first-cla Power.” The storm centre of the British battle-line was the WytschaeteMe inesridge,where Allen by’sCavalry Corps and Shaw’s 9th Brigade of the 3rd Division withstood for forty-eight hours the supreme efforts of two and a half German army corps to dislodge them. The honours of those heroic days were shared by the French 9th Corps and the British 1st Corps (with the 7th Division attached) in their continued defence of the Ypres salient; and the British 2nd Corps, which held a long line on the right in difficult country, and, though forced to give up Neuve Chapelle on the 28th, withstood repeated attacks by superior numbers until the Indian Corps took over their positions. The culminating phase of the battle 272 EUROPEAN WAR began on the 29th, when overwhelming ma es of the enemy stormed the centre of the Ypres salient, held by Haig’s 1st Corps and the 7th Division, and forced our troops back on Gheluvelt. The ground was recovered before nightfall, but fighting of the fiercest character continued all round and beyond the salient, the critical sector of the 31st extending from Gheluvelt to Me ines, on the south, where the ‘oLombaertzyde GA StLGeorges OF at, fo Neuve Chapelie ‘. Chateau~. Thierry 5 &. Sez, &, e inn Gy rae Coulanmices, | ast PARIS CPs id Petit. Meri, mans at their heels. ‘I felt,” afterwards wrote General French, who was not more than a mile or so away at the time, “‘as if the last barrier between the Germans and the Channel seaboard was broken down,” and he spent the worst half-hour his life had ever known. The situation was saved by Brigadier-General FitzClarence, V.C., commanding the ist Guards Brigade of the Ist Division, who, on his own English Miles 6 Ata ee es 4 wavew Lines of the Allied Armies in Northern France and Flanders at the end of October and beginning of November 1914. eseses Chief lines of the invasion of France at the and of August and their southernmost limit.