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The second stage of the battle of Festubert, which began at midnight on 15th May, was more succe ful, the enemy’s frontline trenches being captured on a front of 3,000 yards; but the lo es incurred in winning and holding the positions were disproportionately high. The French effort began more auspiciously as a result of the longer and more intense bombardment which preceded their attack on the 9th, but the series of minor succe es which they won round Souchez, after weeks of ince ant fighting, made little real impre ion on the defences of Lens. The truth was that Germany had so expanded her war-material factories that, with the aid of the Austrians, she could turn out sufficient shells and guns for her main offensive on the Kastern front, and at the same time overweight the Allies in the West. Throughout the summer the line, though never quiescent, and often breaking out in furious bombardments, minor attacks and counter - attacks, and raids on both sides, remained little altered. The hardest fighting of all was round the war-scarred salient of Ypres, still held, as in the first gas attack, by the Second Army, to which some of ‘Kitchener’s Men’ were now attached. It fell to this advance-guard of the New Army to bear the brunt of the first attack on the British with liquid-fire, the Germans, who had already used this new device of the jlammenwerfer against the French, employing it in another desperate a ault on the British lines round Hooge. The New Army units fought with almost incredible gallantry, but were blinded by the unexpected, burning sheets of flame, and while they were still blind the enemy charged and took the first line trenches on a front of some 500 yards. The lo es were avenged on 9th Aug., when the 6th Division recovered all the captured positions, and 400 yards of German trench into the bargain. With the arrival of the reinforcing British divisions of the New Army, General French was able to take over some 17 miles of additional front, the British line thus extending over about 50 miles, with the Belgians on the left holding the remaining 18 miles to the sea. This still left the French army 500 miles to hold. from the British right to the Alps. The summer of 1915 pa ed away without any great offensive on either side. The Germans, now at the floodtide of their sweeping advance against Ru ia, were content to continue their vigorous offensive-defensive in the West. Besides the fighting already referred to, there was ince ant warfare in the Argonne lorest, where the German Crown Prince was noisily active throughout the summer, threatening Verdun, but making no serious advance. The French continued the deadly trench-to-trench warfare in the Souchez area and the ‘Labyrinth’ region nearer Arras, and steadily tightened their hold on the reconquered corner of Alsace, consolidating their positions on the Hartmannsweilerkopf, which had been the scene of continuous fighting in the renewed advance towards Mulhouse. For the most part, however, the French, like the British, were now storing up reserves of ammunition and completing their dispositions for the joint offensive planned for the autumn, when the main objects of Joffre’s general strategic idea for 1915 were for the first time clearly defined, though unattained. A great Allied offensive in the West had become increasingly nece ary in view of the prestige gained by the Central Powers, not only by their tremendous advance into Ru ia, but also by the Allies’ disastrous campaign in Gallipoli, where the failure of the Suvla Bay landing—subsequently dealt with in our account of the operations against Turkey—had just given the enemy additional cause for rejoicing. Joffre’s plan of attack, designed ‘“‘to drive the Germans out of France,’’ was not ripe for execution until towards the end of September. Even then, though General French had for months been gradually ace cumulating troops and ammunition for the blow—the British army now numbering nearly a million men—full strength in both respects was still only half developed. There were two main a aults in the combined offensive, launched on 25th Sept., 1915, the chief of which was in the French centre in Champagne, where de Castelnau, Joffre’s right hand man, attacked with Langle de Cary’s Fourth Army on a 16-mile front between Auberive and Ma iges, the object being to force the Germans back on the Aisne, and,if po ible, cut off the army of the German Crown Prince in the Argonne. Second in importance was the Franco-British advance on the same day in Artois, General French’s object being to push through between Lens and La Ba ée on the north, while Generals Foch and_d’Urbal, on his right, stormed the Vimy heights and attacked Lens from the south. Secondary operations were carried out at various other points in order to distract the enemy’s attention, feint attacks being made by Sir Herbert 288 EUROPEAN WAR 2 Plumer with the 5th Corps—part of the Second Army—east of Ypres, where Bellewarde was temporarily taken; as well as by those units of the First Army occupying the line north of the Béthune-La Ba ée Canal. Similar demonstrations were made at Bois Grenier, and along the slopes of the Aubers Ridge, where British and Indian troops alike fought heroically for ground which, though captured in the first onrush, could not be held under the powerful fire concentrated against them. Battle of Loos. The main British attack was delivered by the First Army under Sir Douglas Haig along a front extending from La Ba ée Canal in the north to the mining village of Grenay on the south, and is conveniently named the battle of Loos. The task of the 4th Corps (Rawlinson), with the 47th (London Territorial) Division on the right, the 15th (New Army) Division in the centre, and the ist Division on the left, was to carry, as its first objective, Loos and the heights between Lens and Hulluch. The lst Corps (Hubert Gough), with the 7th Division on its right, the 9th (New Army) Division in the centre, and the 2nd Division (Horne) on the left extended to the canal, was to link up with the Fourth Army at Hulluch, taking in its stride the Hohenzollern Redoubt and the formidable German fortre es in the Quarries and Fo e 8. Had this general plan succeeded, and the Tenth French Army on the British right advanced in line with it, a great gap would have been made in the German positions in Artois, which, with a similar succe from the mightier French blow in Champagne, would at least have brought relief to the hard pre ed Ru ians in the East, if it did not achieve all that Joffre had hoped for it. As it was, the Allied victory, both in Artois and Champagne, fell far short of its aims, and, save for insubstantial advances, was fruitful chiefiy in bloody experience. An intense bombardment for four Aays preceded the main British advance, and was followed by a gas attack—used by the British on this occasion for the first time.’ Many parts of the German defences along the 7-mile front, however, were far from obliterated when the infantry advanced to the attack, especially on the left, where the 2nd Division was held up by impa able wire defences. The 9th Division had a similar experience on its left wing, where the unde mol i shed defences of the Hohen1 The use of gas, as already pointed out, had been forced on the British by its adoption by the Germane. Ultimately the methods invented by British chemists and physicists outga ed the Germans. zollern Redoubt became a veritable shambles. On its right, however, the leading Scottish battalions scored a fine succe in reaching Fo e 8. On their right the 7th Division did equally well, capturing the Quarries and reaching Cité St. Elie, north of Hulluch, though subsequently forced to rest on the Quarries. In the meantime the 4th Corps, like the Ist, had been repulsed on the left and victorious on the right. Held up on the left by unbroken wire and undamaged German defences, the Ist Division could make no appreciable advance on the Lens-Huliuch road, thus exposing the left flank of the next division in line—the 15th (Scottish). The Scotsmen on their part had made a magnificent advance, first sharing with the London ers of the 47th Division the honour of capturing Loos, and then rushing on impetuously to Hill 70, and beyond as far as Cité St. Auguste, on the outskirts of Lens. Had reserves been available at once to consolidate the gains thus won, Lens itself might have been taken, and a door flung open leading to Lille. But as it was impo ible to say at which part of the long British line they would be needed, Sir John French had retained his reserves far in the rear. When at last they were forthcoming—the new 21st and 24th Divisions, hitherto wuntried—they were put into the battle-line after nightfall, tired and hungry after a heavy 8-mile march. It was impo ible to hold all the ground won during the day. Without reinforcements, and no_ sufficient artillery support, the 15th Division had already been forced to relinquish its hold on Cité St. Auguste, and fell back to the western slopes of Hill 70 on the Lens-Hulluch road. Misdirected and drenched with rain, the two tired reinforcing divisions could do little to help amid the confusion of the battlefield. Their supporting attacks at various points broke against. the still intact German wire or simultaneous counter-attacks by the enemy. One brigade alone (the 72nd) iost 78 officers and 2,000 men out of the 3,600 with which it started. Altogether the lo es of these two divisions amounted to 8,000. Along the southern section they succeeded in maintaining contact with the 47th Division, and in the north helped the Scots of the 9th Division to maintain their hold on Fo e 8; but the Quarries, close by, were lost, and along most of this northern front the day’s gains were gradually whittled away. Another heavy handicap was the fact that the French Tenth Army, on the right of Rawlinson’s Corps, had to postpone its advance until one o’clock 291 EUROPEAN WAR in the afternoon—the British attack had been Jaunched at 6.30 a.m.—and then was forced to direct the corps operating on its left in a south-easterly direction. This involved a considerable gap on the British right, when Rawlinson’s men made their victorious advance. The London ers of the 47th Division, however, not only held on to Loos, but formed a strong defensive flank which averted what might have been a complete disaster. Apart from the captured positions, 57 German officers and 3,000 other prisoners had been taken during the day on the British front, together with 26 field guns and 40 machine-guns. On the following day the Germans counter-attacked in force and recovered Fo e 8, but on the 27th the Guards Division, under the Earl of Cavan, was sent forward and almost yes to red the earlier gains, including Chalk Pit Wood and the slopes of Hill 70. It cost the Guards 3,000 casualties to make good the restored British line. They continued to hold it until the end of the month, when they were relieved. The 15th (Scottish) Division had also been withdrawn, after suffering no fewer than 6,000 casualties. All told, the British lo es in the battle of Loos amounted to 50,000 men and 2,000 officers, including three divisional commanders —Major-General Sir Thompson Capper (7th Division), Major-General G. H. Thesiger (9th Division), and Major General F. D. V. Wing (12th Division) —each of whom was killed. A series of costly counter-attacks on the enemy’s part failed to make much impre ion on the new British line, and mounted up the German casualties until they were estimated at many more than those of the British. The battle died down; the gains were consolidated; but the murderous struggle at close quarters for the Hohenzollern Redoubt and its adjoining entrenchments continued for weeks and months, an outstanding feature of which was the attempt of the 46th (North Midland Territorial) Division to carry the redoubt by storm on 13th Oct. The Midlanders’ task was handicapped, like so many British operations at this period, by inadequate artillery preparation, and though they fought like veterans they could only win the western side of the stronghold at acost of 4,000 casualties. The advance of the 10th French Army on the right of the British was held up in front of Souchez on the opening day of the combined offensive, but made better progre on 26th Sept., when d’Urbal’s troops made themselves masters not only of long contested Souchez, but also of Thelus, La Folie Farm, and most of the Givenchy Wood. But the Vimy heights, notwithstanding that some progre was made along their slopes, still barred the road to Lens from the south. On the 28th the French 9th Corps, at the British Commander-in Chief’s request, took over the defence of Loos, and the British line was rearranged. The main French effort in 1915, as already pointed out, was in Champagne, where a solid week’s bombardment payed the way for the great advance on 25th Sept. Inspired by Joffre’s stirring Order of the Day, “Remember the Marne: Conquer or Die!”? the French troops carried all before them on the greater part of the front. General March and’s Colonial Division broke clean through 2 miles of the main German defences, March and himself falling severely wounded at the head of his men. The greatest advance was made on March and’s right, from Navarin Farm to the Butte de Tahure, where an advance of 2% miles was made before the day closed. But the troops in the centre were robbed of decisive victory by a double check on the wings. On the right the two German strongholds at the Butte de Mesnil and the Main de Ma iges—comparable with the Hohenzollern Redoubt in their strength— held out stubbornly until, after days and nights of ceasele combat, both fell into the attackers’ hands. On the extreme left the a ailants could make practically no headway. Thenceforward the French advance made little progre towards the main objectives, though a breach was made in the enemy’s second line in a fresh attack on the 29th; and a third advance (6th Oct.) won the village and Butte de Tahure. On 20th Oct. the Germans recovered the Butte de Tahure, and in other counter-attacks prevented the French from developing their first initial advance into the greater victory which Joffre had hoped for it. The battle had yielded an impre ive list of captures—the total number of German prisoners being over 23,000 before the end of September, and the captured guns 80—but the Allies’ long line had not materially altered before the autumn offensive gave place to another winter of tedious siege warfare. The year closed with the appointment of Joffre as Commander-in-Chief of all the French forces, General de Castelnau taking over the immediate command of the French troops in France; and the resignation of Sir John French—now created a Viscount of the United Kingdom, and appointed to the Home Command—after more than sixteen months of severe and ince ant strain at the front. Lord 292 EUROPEAN WAR French was succeeded by General Sir Douglas Haig, who had been singled out for promotion by his brilliant achievements since the British army first landed in France.; The Naval War in 1915. Throughout 1915 the operations at sea contained no movements so striking as some of those which marked the opening months of the war. The careers of all the scattered German eruisers were over, the last of them, the K énigsberg, being finally destroyed in the Rufigi River, German East Africa, by the shallow-draught monitors Severn and Mersey; sent out for the purpose from Great Britain. The German High Seas Fleet remained in harbour, waiting for Lord Jellicoe to be tempted or goaded into some imprudent disposition of his forces. Hence the sudden raids en the British Hast Coast, begun in the closing months of 1914. They repeated them once too often, on 24th Jan., 1915, when the raiders, consisting of 4 battle-cruisers, 6 light cruisers, and a force of destroyers, were encountered off the Dogger Bank by the British battle-cruser squadron under Admiral} Beatty, consisting of the Lion, Tiger, and Prince Royal, as well as the New Zealand and Indomitable, and the light eruisers Southampton, Nottingham, Birmingham, and Lowest oft, together with the Arethusa, Aurora, and Undaunted. Outmatched by the 13°5inch guns of Beatty’s ‘Cat’ Squadron of battle-cruisers, the Germans made for home. In the hot chase which followed, the Bticher, last in line of the German battle-cruisers, was hit repeatedly, fell behind, and was eventually sunk by a torpedo from the destroyer Meteor. Her survivors were picked up by the Arethusa. Beatty’s flagship, the Lion, which was leading the pursuit,was partly disabled by a chance shot and had to be towed home, Beatty himself following the chase at some distance in a destroyer. Before he could pick up his place in the pursuit he met his three battle-cruisers returning, these having broken off the action owing to the increasing risk of straying into an enemy mine-field or of falling foul of the mines which the retreating Germans were strewing in their path. Two other German hbattleeruisers had been set on fire by the British shells, the Seydlitz and the Derfjtinger, but, with the rest of the German ships, they made good their scape. Taught by this experience, he Germans made no further naval raids on the East Coast. In the following month (4th Feb.) Vice-Admiral von Pohl, Chief of the German Admiralty Staff, proclaimed a submarine blockade of the whole Iv—J of the British Isles, declaring all the waters round Great Britain and Ireland a military area in which Allied merchant-ships were to be destroyed and neutral ships would incur danger of running the same risk. If the Germans thought they could scare British shipping away by these means, they were soon undeceived. They took heavy toll of peaceful shipping from the first, and shocked the rest of the world by the lengths to which they were prepared to go in developing this ruthle policy, but all their efforts failed to paralyse British trade as they anticipated. The crowning tragedy of this submarine campaign was the sinking of the Cunard liner Lusitania off the south coast of Ireland on 7th May, 1915, with its lo of upwards of 1,000 non-combatants, including over 100 Americans. It was one of the German erimes against humanity in general and Americans in particular which brought the United States into the war on the side of the Allies in 1917. 1916 on the European Fronts.— The Western Campaign. During the year 1916 the unity of command which was postulated as an indispensable preliminary to the victory of the Allies so long before it became a fact was achieved neither 2s _ between Britain and France in the West and Ru ia in the East, nor even as between Britain and France along the Western front. The most that can be said of the co-ordination between the forces under the British and French Commanders-in-Chief is that liaison was established between them, and that as far as was po ible each endeavoured to help the other by diverting to itself the energies of the German forces. The Western fighting embraced two main episodes: the powerful German attacks on Verdun, eventually unsucce ful; and the Allied offensive on the Somme, in which by far the greater share was borne by the British. The year began with numerous German attacks widely separated in locality, and intended to mask the main offensive while keeping the French and British occupied. Hartmannsweilerkopf, in Alsace (2nd to 8th Jan.); Champagne (9th Jan.); Givenchy, Arras, Neuville, Loos (14th Jan. to 6th Feb.); Vimy Ridge, Frise, So is sons, Ypres-Comines area, and Tahure (9th to 20th Feb.) were among them. On 21st Feb. the new battie of Verdun began. This enterprise, though officially accredited to the German Crown Prince, was the design of General von Falkenhayn. Verdun was one of the four fortre es, of which the other three were Belfort, Toul, and 293 EUROPEAN WAR Wpinal, on which French armies defending the capital and the country from an invasion from the east would base themselves. The town lies sunk in the Meuse valley, and the German invasion in 1914 flowed past it along the heights of the Meuse down to St. Mihiel. At the begiuning of the war Verdun was protected by an outer line of forts, with batteries pushed out in a circuit of 30 miles. The forts were not, however, strong enough in 1914, nor the perimeter of defence extended enough, to withstand the new artillery that had reduced Liége and Namur, and a fierce struggle went on during 1915 along the Meuse heights on the east of Verdun and beyond the low hill, on the western side of the town and rivers with a view to pushing out the defences all round. As previously pointed out, much had been done in this direction by General Sarrail, but not enough to deter von Falkenhayn and the German General Staff from selecting Verdun as a point for an attack which, if succe ful, would disorganize seriously the continuity of the French. defences. In 1916, as for two years more, the problem of either combatant was to break through a line of trenches which extended continuously from the sea to Switzerland; and failing a complete break-through, comparable to that which had crippled Ru ia in 1915, to effect a fracture ora deep dent which would compel the loser to reconstruct his system of communications. At the best such a thrust might disclose a fatal weakne in the a ailed; at the next best it would disastrously hamper his future activities. Verdun as a fortre had strong and modern defences. West of the Meuse, north of the town, are low hills the chief of which is the Charny Ridge with dominating strategic points beyond known as Hill 304, Hill 295, Hill 265. The French lines were pushed beyond these into the woods of Avocourt and Forges, but below the heights of Montfaucon, which were the Crown Prince’s head-quarters. On the east of the Meuse the heights rise to a tableland severed by wooded ravines and overlcoking the plain of the Woevre. The line of Freneh trenches embraced all this tableland and a good deal of the plain beyond. Its outer line ran in a bold convex curve from Forges and Consenvoye on the Meuse to Fresnes on the Woevre, but it did not penetrate the woods of Forges or Spin court, and it was below the gun positions on the hills of Ornes. Inside this outer circle was the inner line of Samogneux, Beaumont, Fo es Wood, and Bezonvaux. Inside that again the line of Bras, Douaumont Fort, Hardaumont Wood, Vaux Fort, and Hix. The multiple defences were most elaborate between these two inner Hnes. A weak point was that though such defences would be very exacting of life and effort, yet the outer ones were not pushed out far encugh to place the bridges of the Meuse out of reach of long-range gun-fire; and an overwhelming attack might have jammed a defending army on the east of the Meuse against the river. The French had provided against the po ibility by the multiplication of transport, as well as of inner defences. The Germans heped by the weight, volume, and suddenne of their attack to bring about the not impo ible catastrophe. They ma ed an amount of artillery which, though surpa ed afterwards in the war, was at that time the greatest a emblage that had ever been seen tegether, and accumulated a supply of ammunition exceeding the quantity which all previous experience prescribed, The heavier guns were placed at Ornes, Spin court, and Forges. The woods below afforded cover for a concentration of men; and this concentration, amounting to fourteen divisions, with others in immediate reserve, was at first thrown at the 7-mile sector from Brabant-sur-Meuse to Her be bois, which was held by three French divisions under General Humbert. The attack began on the morning of 2ist Feb. with an artillery bombardment lasting four hours. The sreat weight of shell demolished the rench first-line defences, so that the German troops had little to do but walk over them, while a remnant of the defenders fell back to their supporting positions. These were not sufliciently strong or well constructed to enable weak forces to hold them long against the force of three army corps (18th, 38rd, and 10th, with a Bavarian Division) which the Germans sent in after the guns had done their 294 EUROPEAN WAR work. The effectivene of the German artillery was due in part to its weight, and in part to the fact that French counter-battery work effected little, owing to the thick weather. The trench systems in the Haumont and Caures Woods were carried, but the resistance of parts of the first line at Brabant, Her be bois, and elsewhere was even at this dangerous moment reducing the speed of the German advance, though the momentum was far from exhausted. It was not till next day that the first line was definitely abandoned by the French; and on 23rd Feb. the Jine Samogneux-Her be bois was temporarily held. Before the morning of 24th Feb. the French contracted their line still further by drawing in their outposts from the Woevre. It seemed a matter for surprise at the time that no flank attack was made by the Germans in the Woevre; it had been perhaps thought an unnece ary extension of their general scheme, though the weather, which was bitter and snowy, was unfavourable for operations in that sodden plain. But the German second wave of attack was now rising in fury, and General Pétain, who had undertaken the command of operations on the French side, was still awaiting reinforcements. The character of von Falkenhayn’s attack had become clear, and while to the French the need for holding on was imperative, the Germans had a need no le urgent for hastening operations and exploiting their preliminary succe to a point at which General Pétain could not repair the breach. They had, in faet, two days in which to achieve their aim—24th and 25th Feb. On the 24th they flowed round the Beaumont Woods and came clese to the Talou Ridge, the Poivre Ridge, and the rest of the French line where it ran past Haudremont and Douaumont to Vaux. On the 25th they attacked the Poivre Ridge without much succe , but pre ed the more important sector of their attack close to Douvaumont. Next day, 26th Feb., brought the fateful hour of the struggle. Pétain’s reinforcements were at hand. The Germans made their supreme effort on a 2-mile front at Douaumont, and the picked 24th Brand enb urger Regiment was the spear-head of an a ault which at one moment burst its way into the Fort Douaumont trenches between the village and redoubt—a fine feat of arms which evoked this telegram from the Crown Prince’s head-quarters: ‘‘Douaumont, the eastern pillar of the Verdun defences, is solidly in German hands.” The jadverb alone was misplaced. The position was not held solidly, for Pétain’s reserves, thrown in at the exact moment, flung back the Germans and revented the leak in the defences from being widened by any further inrush. This counter-attack, made by men of Balfourier’s 20th Corps, marked, indeed, the turn of the struggle, for though Douaumont, and Vaux after it, were subsequently to be lost, together with many other historic redoubts and shell-battered points of vantage on either side of the Meuse, and though many you sands of lives were to be swept away in attack and counter-attack on the barren hills about Verdun, yet henceforward the a aults were no different, except in weight, from others which in 1916 and 1917 were. projected by the Germans or the Allies on the amplifying complexities of the armoured defence lines. Von Falkenhayn’s subsequent comment on the operations, which marked the beginning of the creeping paralysis of his plan, was that violent French counter-attacks began, and the German forward movement on the heights was stayed. Though the crisis was over there were many great moments of sleeple effort, of anxiety, and heroism in the months to come, for the last purposeful German a aults on the fortre were made on 15th June, and on 14th July the Germans were still occupying the French with a aults developing from the Thiaumont redoubts, which marked the farthest point southwards to which their long sustained efforts had taken them. Following on these attacks was a considerable pause, during which the Germans were fully occupied elsewhere in dealing with the British attacks on the Som me. The last phase at Verdun in 1916 was that in which the French, inspired by the methods of General Nivelle, thrust the Germans out of all the positions so painfully won, and re-occupied by mid December very much the same lines as those from which the great push of the last week in February had ejected them. The story of Verdun cannot here be told in detail; its principal events are dated as follows: 27th Feb.—Germans take Talou Ridge. 3rd March.—Germans enter Douaumont village. 7th March.—Germans, transferring their efforts to the west of the Meuse, capture Hills 360 and 265. 14th March.—Germans penetrate west of Verdun the line Béthin court-Mort Homme. 20th March.—Germans enter Avocourt Wood. 295 EUROPEAN WAR 29th March.—French recover Avocourt Redoubt. 1st April—Germans, renewing their attacks east of Verdun, capture part of Vaux village. 10th April—Germans make extended attack on both sides of the Meuse, failing at the Mort Homme, but gaining at Poivre Ridge. 5th May.—Germans, renewing westerly attacks, gain ea footing on Hill 304. 20th May.—Germans in a great attack on Mort Homme capture summit of Hill 295. The attack next day enlarged the gains. 24th May.—Cumiéres and Fort Douaumont captured by Germans. Ist June.—Fresh German attack at Fort Vaux east of Verdun. 7th June.—Fort Vaux captured after six days’ fighting. 17th June.—Attack renewed at Mort Homme. The attacks on both sides of the Meuse were prosecuted with increasing vigour till 28th, during which period the Germans took Hillis 321 and 320, as well as Thiaumont Fort (23rd June) and Fleury (24th June). Fleury marked the point of their farthest advance towards the inner line of defences east of the Meuse at Forts Souville and Tavannes. The tide now paused, and on 30th June, a day before the British attack on the Somme, the French retook Thiaumont. The fight i went on in a restricted bu ince ant way through the rest of June and July, the French gradually improving their position. In August activity was renewed at Thiaumont and Fleury. 18th Aug.—French retake whole of Fleury. 9th Sept.—French retake trenches between Fleury and Douaumont. 24th Oct.—The French, after a long pause for readjustment, and now under the direction of General Nivelle, recapture village and fort of Douaumont, Haudremont quarries, and 4,500 prisoners. They thus advanced to lines held in May. 8rd Nov.—Vaux recaptured. On 30th Nov. the German Crown Prince resigned the command of the Verdun front. 15th to 16th Dec.—General Nivelle (who succeeded General Joffre as French Commander-in-Chief on 12th Dec.) orders new attack at Verdun. Vacherauyille, Poivre Ridge, Bezonvauz, Hardaumont recaptured with 11,000 prisoners. In early 1916 the British army was still finding itself, and its new Commander-in-Chief, Sir Douglas Haig, regarded it as insufficiently trained and equipped for the great tasks which lay before it. As an instrument of war it was still not yet ready. It also remained, if not in a water-tight compartment in respect of the Wrench armies at its side, yet with a separate command and in separate control. This may have been merely the nece ary consequence of its state of training; but it is certain that in 1916 there was no one with authority to compel that unity of action and command which in 1918, but not till then, directed the Franco-British armies as one force. Fortunately, perhaps, the German High Command elected to attack the French at Verdun instead of throwing their whole weight on the British, though there were numerous smaller actions along the worn and dangerous Ypres front and elsewhere in the first half of the year. On 14th Feb. the enemy captured some 600 yards of ‘International Trench,’ south-east of Ypres, but they were regained on 17th March, when a bitter and protracted struggle also began for the mine craters at St. Eloi. These were lost and recovered more than once, with heavy casualties on both sides. The Canadians, who had their full share of these costly operations, were again sorely tried at the beginning of June, when the Germans penetrated their front trenches in a surprise attack on the 2nd of that month. Major-General Mercer was killed in this a ault, and General Williams captured. HEleven days jater the Canadians atoned for this set-back by completely re-establishing their broken line. Throughout the first half of 1916 the enemy, not only round Ypres, but also round Loos, at Ploegsteert, Givenchy, and elsewhere, persevered in similar local attempts to keep the British occupied and upset their plans, while he was concentrating his chief efforts towards beating down the Wrench defences at Verdun. The attack on Verdun, as already related, ultimately broke down, and the period in which it was at its height was utilized by Sir Douglas Haig to bring his forces as near as po ible to the point at which they could undertake with succe an attack of tho first magnitude against the entrenched German lines. The date of the attack was premature, and was hurried on in order to take some weight off the hara ed French armies at Verdun. 296 EUROPEAN WAR It began on Ist July; the chosen terrain was the River Somme, and the great offensive, in which the French joined, was over a 28-mile front from Gommecourt, north of the Somme, to Dom pierre, south of that river. First Battle of the Somme. The German position in the Somme area was situated on the high ground which is the water-shed between the Scheldt and the Somme. The ground runs east-south-east, and its hills fall into long irregular spurs divided by wide valleys. On the forward slopes of the hills the German first-line defences ran from the Somme at Curlu to Fri court; at Fri court the defence line turned north, cro ing the Ancre, thence pa ing over the summit of the watershed near Hébuterne and Gommecourt to Arras. Between the Somme and the Ancre a second line of defence had been constructed 2 miles behind the first, and on it had been lavished all the ingenuities of fortification which the German engineers afterwards developed in the so-called Hindenburg lines. South of the Somme, where the French were to co-operate with Sir Douglas Haig, the defences were not so elaborate; it was not here that the Germans, who were fully aware of the impending British attack, expected the blow to fall. They expected the greatest weight to be felt towards the Ancre. The British preparatory bombardment, delivered by a force of artillery far greater than any British army had heretofore po e ed, began on 24th June, and deluged the German positions with shells for a week. It was aided by the efforts of the Royal Flying Corps, which, at this time, had a decided superiority over that of the Germans. The British attack on ist July began in broad daylight, and was delivered principally by Raw* lins on’s Fourth Army of five corps, with a subsidiary attack by the Third Army (Allen by) opposite Gomme: court, where one corps only was sent forward. The sectors attacked, beside that at Gommecourt, may be designated: Beaumont-Hamel; River Ancre, including Thiepval; La _ Boi elle and Con talma is on; Fri court; River Somme at Montauban. The French attack, designed by Foch and delivered by the French Sixth Army (Fayolle), and Tenth Army (Micheler), was delivered along an 8-mile front, taking in a sector on either side of the Somme from Mar i court, through Frise and Dom pierre, to Fay. Severe as were the British preparatory and final bombardments, they did not succeed in demolishing the German systems of defences, and had left machine-gun nests intact. The efficacy of the machine-gun was one of the bitterest le ons to be learnt by the flower of the British armies of 1916, and the great lo es of 1st July were largely due to the German handling of this weapon. Taking the British and French attack as a whole, it may be said to have failed towards the north and succeeded towards the south. The heaviest rebuff was inflicted on the corps of Allen by’s Third Army which operated opposite Gommecourt. From Thiepval, acro the Ancre, the Germans had ma ed their best fighting material and the greatest weight of their artillery. The 10th Corps (Morland), which included the fainous 36th (Ulster) Division, Highlanders, and North Countrymen, did wonders, and actually penetrated the Thiepval Redoubt but could not hold on to its gains. Hunter-Weston’s 8th Corps of picked troops, including the 29th Division from Gallipoli, found the task of a aulting Beaumont-Hamel teo strong for them. Farther south there were succe es which increased in value towards the Somme. The 13th Corps (Congreve) carried Montauban and Mametz; the 15th Corps (Horne) surrounded Fri court; the 3rd Corps (Pulteney) forced its way at great cost into La Boi elle. The French armies, well handled, and aided by the advantage of finding the Germans le on their guard, made ground on either side of the Somme. Three corps participated in the a ault—the 20th (Balfourier) from Mar i court to the Somme, where the hardest fighting was at Curlu and Hard i court; the ist Corps (Brandelat,); and the 35th Corps (Allonier). The last two walked through the Germans, and the French lo es were light. As the result of the day’s fighting along the whole extent of the front, the British captured 3,500, and the French 6,000 prisoners; but the casualties of the a ailants were close on 50,000. The second day’s fighting, though it emphasized the certainty that no great German defeat had been inflicted, enabled both the French and British commanders to enlarge the ground they had won, and the advantage was further exploited in the few days that followed. By the 5th of July over a front of 6 miles the Germans had been pushed back a mile; the British had captured 6,000, the French 8,000 prisoners. This was the first blow in the Somme battle. Its results, compared with those of the German attack at Verdun, do not afford warrant for regarding it as a great victory. It became clear that there was no precedent to follow other than that set by the Germans at Verdun, namely that of systematically reducing the enemy’s position. This 297 fy VU 9 ¥ S > e Manoaueno @7% Ypres, ey Paqiyv qson4m 2% || cs P Y yyy. tA add a 1G™S109D” pyidwo oe Bei W D> Va a rN qsnos3esg | \ WH: a, % J Ly % PSITeES Lye Z Yj, A eheee Y WM y Yd Tasipes-Aypres jearoyy? L.p0o ph Veta. Yy 3311140 Kf ~: Li LG Ae synaoqsa7y° ty, as Ws WEN Aoysurs Yjge # ‘ oe \ AuSinbo0y° ma Sse! qanovapneny w 3332]921N0D ™ aheqqy | noone ‘ S5IVS I] » © ysnoouaineeg pnorspursy Ry, SIIINA 5 Opes % oskd /: ak srncoueinte Roe Z jewep-qwounrag f Ssuownesyy ° ysnoourg? 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The principal events in this protracted struggle for positions and fortified strongholds after the opening phase already described were: 14th to 15th July.—British attack German second line, capturing Longueval, Trénes Wood, Delville Wood, and 2,000 prisoners. 23rd July.—Second phase of Somme battle begun. Poziéres captured 26th July. 16th}Aug.—French take Belloy near the 3omme; 1,300 prisoners. 29th Aug.—Total British captures on Somme to date: ae otlicers, 15,203 men, 86 gu 15th Sept. —British panes (third phase of Somme battle) using tanks for the first time; Martinpuich and High Wood taken. Lesbceufs and Morval captured 25th Sept. Combles and Thiepval captured 26th Sept. 30th Sept.—Thiepval Ridge captured. 10th Oct.—French take Ablaincowt, south of Somme, and 1,300 prisoners. 21st to 23rd Oct.—British take 1,018 prisoners. 12th Nov.—Ffrench take Saillisel. 13th Nov.—Battle of the Ancre (fourth phase of Somme battle). British take 4,000 prisoners. 29th Dec.—Sir D. Haig’s dispatches relating to Somme battle. During the period 1st July to 18th Nov. were captured 38,000 prisoners, 125 guns, 514 machine-guns. The number of casualties inflicted on the Germans has not been made known. Those of the British amounted to 22,923 officers and 476,553 men. A number ot these were, of course, not permanent casualties. Ru ian Campaign, 1916. During the winter 1915-6 the Ru ian armies were reorganized by General Alexieff under the nominal command of the Tsar. The Grand Duke Nicholas, as already stated, went to the Caucasus in 1915, and while Viceroy there the succe ful advance of General Yudenitch to Erzerum (captured 16th Feb.) was made. The Ru ian armies of the north were placed under General Kuropatkin (Riga to Dvinsk) and General Hverts (Vilna to the Pripet), and the commands embraced respectively the Twelfth, Fifth, and First; and the Second, Tenth, Fourth, and Third Armies. In the southern group of armies, commanded by General Ivanoff till April, and by General Bru iloff afterwards, were included the Highth Army (Kaledin) in the Rovno sector, Eleventh Army of Volhynia (Sakharoff), Seventh Army of Eastern Galicia (Scherbatcheff), and Ninth Army of the Dniester (Lechitsky). Facing the northern group of armies were German forces directed nominally by Genera] Hindenburg, actually by ‘General Ludendorff. The local commanders were von Below and von Scholtz (Riga to Dvinsk), von Fichhorn (Lake Narotch), von Fabeck and von Woyrsch with an Austrian army corps. A force under the nominal command of Prince Leopold of Bavaria connected these German armies with those which faced General Bru iloff (succe or to Ivanoff). The Volhynian sector (Third AustroHungarian Army) was under yon Brlog; Rovno sector (Fourth Army) under the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand, stiffened by a reserve under von Linsingen. Farther south were General Boehm-Ermolli’s army (Second), and the two armies of Bothmer and Pflanzer-Baltin. The Ru ians, who had been recruiting far larger numbers than they could feed or employ, were much more numerous. The Germans were well entrenched and superior in artillery. he German effort in 1916 was diverted to the West. The Ru ians, who were now better supplied in guns and ammunition than heretofore, seized the opportunity to take and keep the initiative in the East. They began before the end of 1915 with an offensive in Galicia on the Styr and Strypa, and continued their attacks through January; while in February there was severe fighting on the Dniester, in the Bukovina, and in Volhynia. The first full-dre attack was made, however, in the northern sector, where General Everts began the battle of Lake Narotch on 18th March. Fighting here was renewed eight times before 14th April, and the Ru ian gain on the Vilna road did not warrant the heavy lo es (12,000), which were increased by a German counter-attack on 28th April. The important part of the Ru ian campaign took place in the southern group of armies commanded by bBru iloff, who used his superiority of numbers against the Austrian generals and their very mixed troops with brilliant effect. On 4th June the Ru ian armies from the Pripet to the Bukovina were set in motion simultaneously against the long at or guarded Austrian front, seeking the 300 EUROPEAN WAR weak places. Generals Kaledin and Sakharoif, in the sectors nearest the Pripet, engaged the armies of von Brlog and the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand; and the Ru ian columns, though held up in the marshes supporting von Brlog near Kolki, swept through the archduke’s defences like paper. They marched swiftly forward over rolling country to the Styr, driving the Austro-Hungarian levies before them. By 16th June the Jeading Ru ian columns were 12 miles from Vladimir Volhynok. North of this apex Kolki and Svidniki, on the Stokhod, were captured; south of the so-called Lutsk salient thus created Sakharoff captured Dubno, and was outside Brody on the 16th. In twelve days this most damaging attack captured 70,000 men, 83 guns, and created a salient which, at its greatest depth, was 50 miles from the 80-foot base from which it had been started. Von Linsingen’s reserves were sent in, and Ludendorff took matters in hand. General Scherbatcheff had simultaneously attacked von Bothmer from Kozlov to the Dniester. The Ru ian general reached Bucacz (8th June) and cro ed the Strypa. He also captured 17,000 prisoners and 30 guns, but von Bothmer, athwart a good line of railway, could not be enveloped, and fell back sullenly and without disaster. General Lechitsky, in the most southerly sector, struck with fury at Pfianzer-Baltin, and cut through his centre on the hills between the Dniester and the Pruth while turning his flank at the Dniester bridge-heads at Zaleszezyki and Biskupie. The net result was the wreck of PfianzerBaltin’s army, which was forced to retreat acro the Pruth to the Car path i ans. Lechitsky captured 39,000 men; and Bru iloff’s great attack had succeeded triumphantly on both wings. It had made le headway in the centre. There were two lines of subsequent pre ure or advance open to him, one, the more northerly, towards Kovel; the other, with, as object, the further destruction of the southern Austro-Hungarian armies, towards Halicz. Ludendorff, however, had by this time formed his plans for the restoration of equilibrium; and Linsingen, with his reserves, was employed to make amplification of the Ru ian succe at the most northerly portion of the salient impracticable. Linsingen struck at the Stokhod River cro ings. Bru iloff countered by bringing up a fresh army under General Lesch with the object of outflanking Linsingen in his turn; and another army, under General Rogoza, was ordered to occupy aw + General Woyrsch’s attention farther north. These manceuyres had considerable succe , Lesch and Rogoza capturing 17,000 men. But though in these and subsequent engagements the largest numbers of captures fell to the Ru ians, and though in the extreme south they were again able to advance to the Car path i an pa es, no disaster on the largest scale was inflicted. The Germans were able to withdraw their allies and to allow the Ru ian attack to wear itself out. Neverthele , the Ru ian victories were of immense service to the Allies, and by the autumn of 1916 it seemed that the prospects of the Central Empires were darker than at any period of the war. The Ru ian advance, in its resolution and generalship, need not shrink from a comparison with that with which Foch ended the war two years later. By the middle of September, Generals Kaledin, Lesch, Sakharoff, Scherbatcheff, with Bezobrazoff and Lechitsky in the south, had captured 370,000 prisoners, 450 guns, and an amount of supplies as great as that which fell into ae cudort hands at St. Quentin in Balkan Campaign, 1916. After the conclusion of Bru iloff’s triumypant di ipation of the Austroungarian armies in the early autumn of 1916, the way was open for Rumanian co-operation with the Allies, and Rumania, though neither united nor completely ready, was urged to enter the war. This she did on 28th E (5/5) e