BOLSHEVISM

pertaining to the Ru ian Communist Party. The name took its origin from the split which took place in the Ru ian Social-Democratic Party, which occurred in 1903, the larger faction being known as the ‘bolsho,’ meaning the majority, the minority being the ‘menshe,’ their partisans. thenceforward being known as ‘polsheviki’ and ‘mensheviki.’ The split was over principles which had brought about splits in the socialist parties in all other countries where the Socialist idea had a following. The original Marxian theory, based on so-called ‘scientific’ reasoning, was that through inevitable development the capitalists were daily growing richer, acquiring more and more of the wealth of the nations, while at an equal rate, the workers were daily becoming more impoverished. This proce might be hastened or delayed by contributing causes, but the final crisis must be inevitable. Then, in sheer desperation, the workers would revolt, overthrow the capitalist system and a ume control through the ‘dictatorship of the proletariat,’ which would continue until the proletariat, or working cla , had absorbed all other elements of society, after which would come true socialism, based on a real democracy. This natural proce of evolution, as it was supposed to be, could be hastened only by one form of effort; the workers must organize on the idea of ‘cla consciousne ;’ first of all they must strive to bring a realization of the fundamental facts to all other workers,- that the working cla organization might be strengthened and developed; this organization must then prepare itself for the future respon-ibility which it must a ume when the crisis came, the taking over the reins of government. There must, however, be no activities in politics, since the formation of political pazties lead to relations with the capitalist state, and inevitably to compromise. Armed revolution was not a, chief feature of this program, but it was recognized that when the disorders attending the crisis, the social revolution, came, it might be nece ary to employ armed force to bring about the new social order. This was the main aspect of the Marxian doctrine, which the first disciples of Karl Marx accepted. As time pa ed, however, its impracticability grew more and more obvious to the le fanatical Socialists. IYor one thing, labor organization tended to check the tendency indicated, by improving the economic conditions of the workers. Liberal legislation also mitigated some of the abuses of the capitalist system. Middle cla social reformers also brought about improvements which acted as a check. Gradually Socialists began to realize that if they did not a ociate themselves with these ameliorating causes, they would gain no popular support and remain limited to a few doctrinaire groups, too small in numbers to carry influence. Thus, first in Germany, political socialist parties were formed, demanding remedgrew in number, and formed what is generally called the ‘right wing.’ In most European countries they were in a large majority ‘before the Great War broke out, and most of them supported their governments in prosecuting the struggle. Ru ia, however, the socialists had not come up against any practical experience, since there were no reforms. There was, in the first place, only a very small capitalist cla . Absence of suffrage denied them experience in politics. For this reason the doctrinaire socialists were there in @ majority. These were the ‘bolsheviki,’ after the split, which occurred in Ru ia at a much later date than in other countries. At their head was Vladimir Tllitch Ulyaniov or, as he is better known, Nikolai Lenine. After the outbreak of hostilities his party was much depleted by desertions, for many found it impo ible to resist the call of their country when it came to a war against their hereditary enemies, the Germans. Those that remained were mostly in Switzerland or other neutral countries. Throughout the war they remained consistently opposed to taking part, since it was thear theory that the war was nothing but a clash between the big capitalist interests in the various countiies. But they continued active in spreading their pro that the workers should not fight each other, but should join together and, as an international body, overwhelm capitalism. This propaganda pa ed unheeded during the first few years of the war, while yet national enthusiasm ran high. But eventually the tremendous strain on human morale began to manifest itself, in Ru ia first of all. Suddenly came the crash of the Ru ian autocracy, brought about, first by its own weakne , secondly by the stupidity of the man at the helm, Premier Stolypin. It was the patriotic Socialists, however, under Alexander Kerensky, who were able to take immediate advantage of the situation, they being on the ground. Thus they established a Socialist Republic, adapted to conditions. They realized the nece ity of continuing the fighting with the Allies, until the Germans were decisively beaten, since German Imperialism was, after all, a greater danger than capitalism. This reasoning, however, was not apparent to the ignorant peasants forming the rank and file of the Ru ian Army. They welcomed the new government, truly, since they detested the autocracy. But they were sick of fighting. Kerensky exhorted them to continue fighting. For a while they responded. And then the Bolsheviki propaganda began ‘to circulate among them, meeting their deepest desire—an end to fighting. It was the grand opportunity of the Bolsheviki, and they made the most of it. Tons of literature were smuggled into the Ru ian lines. No doubt German money financed much of this, but if such leaders as Lenine were aware of it, it was most a uredly in no attitude of friendline toward Germany. It was the reaction of the Ru ian soldier against warfare and the life in the trenches which brought about the downfall of the Kerensky Government. The Bolsheviki stepped into the breach, as it were, through no effort on their part. Thus, on November 7, 1917, they came into control of the ruins of the great Ru ian Empire; consisting of a handful of Marxian theorists, supported by the ma es because they declared there would be no more fighting. The history of Bolshevism since that date is nothing but one continuous record of adaptation, the Bolsheviki leaders, or Communists, as the original followers of Marx called themselves, having remained in power only through their long series of compromises between actual fact and their doctrines. That these dreamers, disciples of a theory evolved out of the head of a bookish scholar, should have been able to remain in power six years, long enough in which to acquire practical experience, is perhaps one of the most remarkable things history. Conditions, however, were in their favor. The country was big and isolated, too big to be easily invaded; there was anyway a lack of experienced administrators among Ru ians; and, as determining a feature as any, it chanced that’ at least two of the Bolshevik leaders, Lenine and Trotzsky, happened to be men of most remarkable latent ability. Whatever his views as a theorist, history will recognize Lenine’s as one of the greatest administrative minds of modern times, while the dynamic energy and executive capacity of Leon Trotzsky, reorganizer of the Ru ian Red Army has, probably, not been equalled during his own period of activity. From November, 1917, until the beginning of 1920, may be said to be the first phase of Bolshevism in power. During this period, and especially during the first year and a half, Bolshevism was pure Marxian doctrines, attempting to adapt facts to itself. The leaders were firmly convinced that the hour of social reyolution had come, according to the Marxian schedule, and that they had merely fulfilled their program by a uming power at the critical moment. That the cataclysm had been brought about by military reverses, and not by industrial disorganization, meant nothing to them. The ma es had revolted. For them there was nothing to do but to step forward and proclaim the ‘dictatorship of the proletariat,’ which they formally did when they disbanded the Constituent A embly on January 19, 1918. Members to the Constituent A embly had been elected by landowners, merchants, bankers, etc., whereas Marxian theory demanded that only property-le workers should be represented. In di olving the A embly the Bolsheviki were only acting, as every intelligent Socialist realized, according to their own principles. They could not consistently have done otherwise. But Marx had warned that the social revolution must be international to be effective. For a brief period it certainly looked as though this might be the case, to a large extent, at least; in Hungary and Germany it appeared that the proletariat might a ert itself. Again according to their own principles, the Bolsheviki did everything in their power to further this tendency. Ru ian gold was lavishly spent on furthering revolution in other countries. But those revolutions failed. In other countries +n there were no such powerful leaders as Lenine and Trotzsky, the capitalist cla was there a real, experienced element, and the workers had faith in its ability. Following the failure of the revolutionary movements abroad, came the danger that Marx had in mind. Ru ia was invaded by armies representing the reactionary elements of Ru ia itself, and of the other countries, especially reactionary France. From this danger Bolshevism was saved, not by its own ‘cla conscious proletariat,’ but by the patriotism of the peasant cla . The peasants saw in the enemy not capitalist legions, but foreign invaders, and made short shrift of them as such. Bolshevism was saved in two ways: from a military overthrow; secondly, from internal disruption. For now the Ru ian peasantry, which cared not a straw about Marxian theory, had faith in the Bolsheviki as defenders of national integrity. But now Bolshevism was experiencing its first disillusion. Social revolution was not going to be international. That fact became every day more obvious. To this fact they gradually adapted themselves. From open enmity toward all the ‘capitalist’ countries, they now turned to a policy of friendly relations. Recognition was sought. Envoys were sent abroad to open up relations. The second disusion was at home. The peasants, 80 per cent of the population, refused toe act as a proletariat should act. They wanted land, property; they wanted it as personal property. Marx had, in fact, warned that the peasant cla would always be an obstacle to the social revolution. And here came another big conce ion, a compromise with principle. Land nationalization had to go by the board. It was parceled out among the peasants. Meanwhile industry had been nationalized. The comparatively few industrial plants in Ru ia were taken over. But it happened that distribution, a function carried on in other countries by jobbers, wholesalers and retailers and other middlemen, was in Ru ia largely in the hands of the consumers’ co-opera the membership of which was largely workers, had been left alone up till the beginning of 1920. Then they were nationalized by decree. How tremendous a mistake that was may be judged from the fact that the decree was revoked in March, 1921. Lenine, in fact, had been opposed to it in the beginning. It was one of the most important compromises yet made, for thereby Bolshevism re- - nounced its control over that phase of industry—distribution. From now on the disintegration of the old ideas was rapid. The nationalized industries were daily deteriorating, the output dwindling. Conce ions were put up to action to foreign capitalist syndicates. Foreign capital was eagerly sought to develop natural resources.. The changed policy was summed up in a speech made by Lenine in October, 1922, in which he said that ‘his hearers could not but remark the sudden change in the economic policy of the Soviet, etc.’ The year 1923 found Bolshevism in Ru ia differing very little from any other party in power in any other country. The ideals of Marxian Socialism, or Communism, are still held up before the rising generation in the schools and colleges, but in actual practice it is recognized that they are only ideals, attainable only after years of much self-sacrifice, a sacrifice which the Ru ian people, and especially the Ru ian peasants, seem little disposed to make. (53° 35’ N., 2° 26’ W.), town, Lancashire, England; center of cotton industry; icals; has iron foundries, sawmills; coal mines in neighborhood; created parliamentary borough, 1832; returns two members; grammar school, founded 1641; stormed by Royalists in Civil War. Pop. 1921, 182,200. (1867), son of Charles E. and Sarah Knowles Bolton. Graduated at Harvard University in 1890. A istant Harvard Library, 1890-1893; Librarian Brook line Library, 1894-1898 and of Boston Atheneum Library since that date. Author Love Story of Ursula Wolcott, 1895; Private Soldier Under Washington, 1902; Scotch-Irish Pioneers, 1910; American Library History, 1911 and Portrazts of the Founders, 1918. Has written extensively on library administration and on library topics in general. 1916), an American author, wife of Charles E. Bolton, merchant and philanthropist. Her writings include Girls Who Became Famous, 1886; Famous American Authors, 1887; Famous American Statesmen, 1888, and Famous Types of Womanhood, 1892. Austrian philosopher; was ordained to the priesthood, and became prof. of Philosophy at Prague, but his opinions led to his being deprived of the exercise of both offices; author of Lehrbuch der Religion swi ens chaft, and other philosophical works.