The purposes of B

are, first, to promote invariability of the monetary unit, and thereby attain steadine or regularity of general values; second, to provide a larger volume of actual money, and so avoid an unnece ary use of so-called "token," "credit," or "representative" money-bank notes and the like-i. e., currency that calls for redemption in some other form of currency, upon which promise of redemption its integrity is based. In support of the first claim, it is urged that two metals, collectively, will not, and cannot, be subject to fluctuations in exchange value so great as those to which either one, singly, might be subjected; hence, a double (more properly an alternative ) standard of value gives greater promise of a stable monetary unit than the system of monometallism can po ibly provide. The history of B. in France (1803-1873), and in the U. S. (1792-1873) is cited to prove this contention, it being shown that during that time a parity of the metals was very closely maintained between the ratios 15:1 and 16:1; and this notwithstanding the fact that the world's production of silver was largely in exce of these ratios during the first half of the period named, while that of gold was equally exce ive during the second half. As we shall see, these claims are substantially correct; and, inasmuch as true B. was practically abolished in 1871-73, no later actual tests of the system are on record and available for the purposes of argument. As to the second claim, it must be freely conceded that the placing of silver upon an exact equality with gold would at once double the quantity of the world's so-called "primary" money, if at a ratio of 15:1 or 16: 1. Whether the effect of such action would be beneficial, or otherwise, is another question. Bimetallism is entirely feasible, as a principle; that is to say, a double standard is quite po ible as a legal enactment, though probably impracticable as a physical fact. Both gold and silver are commodities, and will forever obey the natural law of commodity, the action of which law, however, is certain to be greatly influenced by statutes governing coinage. It is by reason of this natural law of supply and demand that B. , in actual practice, is likely to resolve itself into monometallism of an alternative character. That is to say, if there shall be established a "double standard," i.e., a system under which either of two metals is legally recognized as a monetary standard, it is inevitable that the one which is actually a fraction the cheaper of the two (at the fixed ratio) will be the one which constitutes the actual standard, and will so continue until parity shall be again reached through the operation of natural laws. That there may be two separate, differing standards for the same thing, at the same time, is manifestly absurd; but a legalized choice between two different standards may exist-in fact, must exist, under B. The inexorable law of supply and demand renders it extremely improbable that any two commodities will long exactly sustain a given value relation, and the utmost that can be accomplished by legal enactment is to prevent a serious divergence from the fixed ratio. But that this may be done by the bimetallic system, is abundantly proved by the history of the French-American experiments of 18031873 and 1792-1873, during the course of which, and regardle of tremendous variations in the relative production of the two metals, a commercial ratio was IMG:content-0862.png:[blocks in formation] Analysis of this table proves that neither the proportionate overproduction of silver during the first 48 years (averaging about 366 ounces to each ounce of gold) nor the deluge of the yellow metal following 1848, was able to upset the coinage ratios of France and the U. S., the average annual variation being, in fact, only four-fifths of one per cent. In the decade of greatest. gold production (1850-60) alone did the bullion ratio go higher than 15%:1 (15:29:1), and it never fell below the American ratio of 16:1. From all of which is clearly evident that the ratio of production had no important effect upon the commercial ratio before demonetization was effected; and that the divergence in prices since the decade of 1871-80 cannot be accounted for by a corresponding increase in the ratio of production. The great growth of the silver product since 1873-and particularly since 1878-may be ascribed almost wholly to the mistaken zeal of the so-called "friends of silver," who foolishly insisted upon its large I purchase for conversion into money that was dishonored in advance. This course, which stimulated the production and reduced the price of silver one-half in spite of government purchases, has supplied the advocates of gold monometallism with their most effective argument, and one that is superficially unanswerable i.e., that bimetallism, as proposed in the campaign of 1896, would provide a "50-cent dollar," and consequently, a dishonest currency. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the world's stock of silver and gold was estimated to be in the proportion of 15 or 152 ounces of silver to one of gold, which closely accorded with the ratio adopted by the U. 8. in 1792. Our change of ratio, in 1834, had the perfectly natural effect of driving our silver out of circulation, the French ratio of 15% to 1 being more favorable even after paying the cost of transportation. We had thenceforth (gold) monometallism in fact, although our system neverthele remained bimetallic; for B. , as we have already observed, might be more properly termed alternative monometallism . The gold discoveries in California and Australia (1847-1851) emphasized the undervaluation of silver at our mints, but did not materially change the commercial ratio of the two metals in the world's markets, although within the twelve years from 1848 to 1860, the stock of gold in the hands of civilization was literally doubled. As gold depreciated, so did silver; the two metals were held together by a bond that could not be broken by the vici itudes of mining enterprise. Such, indeed, is the purpose and natural effect of bimetallism; but, while the figures we have just examined seem to show beyond doubt the power of this system to preserve an approximate parity in the face of the widest variations in production, this does not at all prove that a monetary unit thus sustained will be invariable or even nearly so. The truth is that under the bimetallic system the two metals are certain to appreciate or depreciate approximately in unison, remaining constantly in close touch with each other. The extent of such appreciation or depreciation will depend, at least to a degree, upon the combined production of the two metals. It is claimed, and not unreasonably, that under the bimetallic system fluctuations will be le frequent, and that, consequently, a more stable monetary unit will be maintained; but no well-informed disputant, whether of the bimetallic or the monometallic school, now a erts that complete stability is attainable by either method. On the contrary, it may be confidently stated that no monetary system employing a marketable commodity (or commodities) as a so-called "standard of value," can po ibly provide an absolutely changele monetary unit. The question, then, as between the two metallic schools, is: By which is the greater degree of stability to be attained?