Pronouns of the First Person

"The ordinary uses of 'I' and 'we,' as the singular and plural pronouns of the first person, would appear to be above all ambiguity, uncertainty, or dispute. Yet when we consider the force of the plural 'we,' we are met with a contradiction; for, as a rule, only one person can speak at the same time to the same audience. It is only by some exceptional arrangement, or some latitude or license of expre ion, that several persons can be conjoint speakers. For example, a plurality may sing together in chorus, and may join in the responses at church, or in the simultaneous repetition of the Lord's Prayer or the Creed. Again, one person may be the authorized spokesman in delivering a judgment or opinion held by a number of persons in common. Finally, in written compositions, the 'we' is not unsuitable, because a plurality of persons may append their names to a document. "A speaker using 'we' may speak for himself and one or more others; commonly he stands forward as the representative of a cla , more or le comprehensive. 'As soon as my companion and I had entered the field, we saw a man coming toward us '; ' we like our new curate'; 'you do us poets the greatest injustice'; ' we must see to the efficiency of our forces.' The widest use of the pronoun will be mentioned presently. "'We' is used for 'I' in the decrees of persons in authority; as when King Lear says: 'Know that we have divided In three our kingdom.' By the fiction of plurality a veil of modesty is thrown over the a umption of vast superiority over human beings generally. Or, 'we' may be regarded as an official form whereby the speaker personally is magnified or enabled to rise to the dignity of the occasion. "The editorial 'we' is to be understood on the same principle. An author using 'we' appears as if he were not alone, but sharing with other persons the responsibility of his views. "This representative position is at its utmost stretch in the practice of using 'we' for human beings generally; as in discoursing on the laws of human nature. The preacher, the novelist, or the philosopher, in dwelling upon the peculiarity of our common constitution, being himself an example of what he is speaking of, a ociates the rest of mankind with him, and speaks collectively by means of 'we.' ' We are weak and fallible'; ' we are of yesterday'; ' we are doomed to di olution.' 'Here have we no continuing city, but we seek one to come.' "It is not unfrequent to have in one sentence, or in close proximity, both the editorial and the representative meaning, the effect being ambiguity and confusion. 'Let us [the author] now consider why we [humanity generally] overrate distant good.' In such a case the author should fall back upon the singular for himself—' I will now consider—.' ' We [speaker] think we [himself and hearers together] should come to the conclusion.' Say, either ' I think,' or ' you would.' "The following extract from Butler exemplifies a similar confusion: 'Suppose we [representative] are capable of happine and of misery in degrees equally intense and extreme, yet we [rep.] are capable of the latter for a much longer time, beyond all comparison. We [change of subject to a limited cla ] see men in the tortures of pain—. Such is our [back to representative] make that anything may become the instrument of pain and sorrow to us .' The 'we' at the commencement of the second sentence—' We see men in the tortures'—could be advantageously changed to 'you,' or the pa ive construction could be substituted; the remaining we 's would then be consistently representative. "From the greater emphasis of singularity, energetic speakers and writers sometimes use 'I' as representative of mankind at large. Thus: 'The current impre ions received through the senses are not voluntary in origin. What I see in walking is seen because I have an organ of vision.' The question of general moral obligation is forcibly stated by Paley in the individual form, 'Why am I obliged to keep my word?' It is sometimes well to confine the attention of the hearer or reader to his own relation to the matter under consideration, more especially in difficult or non-popular argument or exposition. The speaker, by using 'I,' does the action himself, or makes himself the example, the hearer being expected to put himself in the same position."—Bain's "Composition Grammar."