Tactics, Military

Is the science and art of disposing military forces in order for battle, and performing military evolutions in the presence of an enemy. It is divided into grand tactics , or the tactics of battle, and elementary tactics , or the tactics of instruction. Tactics is the strategy of the battle-field; the science of manœuvring and combining those military units which drill, discipline, and the regimental system have brought to the perfection of machines. It was admirably described by Napoleon as the art of being the stronger ,—that is, of bringing an overwhelming force to bear on any given point, whatever may be the relative strength of the entire armies opposed. The earliest records of battles are those of mere single combats, in which the chiefs, fighting either on foot or in chariots, performed great deeds; and the commonalty, who apparently were without discipline, were held in profound contempt. With the growth of democracy arose the organization of the phalanx (which see), the advance of which was irresistible, and its firmne equally so, if charged in front. It, however, changed front with great difficulty; was much deranged by broken ground, and failed entirely in pursuit, or if attacked in flank. Far lighter and more mobile was the Roman legion . (See Legion .) Among Roman tactics was also the admirable intrenchment, which they scarcely ever omitted as an additional source of strength for their position. “Events reproduce themselves in cycles;” and with the decay of Roman civilization came again the mail-clad heroes and cavaliers—mounted this time on horses—who monopolized the honors of battle, while the undisciplined footmen had an undue share of the dangers. Later in the feudal period, this disparity between knight and footman was diminished by the employment of bodies of archers, whose shafts carried instant death. The adoption of gunpowder for small-arms altogether neutralized the superiority of the armored knight. This change brought infantry into the front place in battle, and threw cavalry into the status of an auxiliary. The French revolutionary wars tended much to the development of artillery as a field-weapon, and Napoleon employed this terrible weapon to its fullest extent, a practice followed by the best modern generals, who never risk a man where a cannon-ball can do the work. Frederick the Great was considered an innovator for fighting with infantry four deep. During the French war, the formation of three deep became general, and still obtains in several European armies. Before the battle of Waterloo, the British leaders had acquired sufficient confidence in their troops to marshal them in a double line. It is doubtful whether the advance in arms of precision will not soon nece itate the formation in a single line, or even in a single line in open order. We will now notice briefly a few of the more important principles, as our space will not permit us to go into that intricate science, modern tactics. As to the art of being stronger , which is undoubtedly the highest recommendation in a general, we may cite the example of the battle of Rivoli. In 1796, Napoleon was besieging Mantua with a small force, while a very much smaller army of observation watched the Austrians. The Austrian commander had collected at Trent a force powerful enough to crush completely the French army, with which he was marching south. Parallel with his course lay the Lake of Garda, and to prevent the enemy escaping up one side as he marched down the other, the Austrian leader divided his army into two powerful corps, and marched one down each side of the lake. The instant the young French general knew of this division he abandoned the siege of Mantua, collected every available man, and marched against one body of the enemy. Though far inferior on the whole, he was thus superior at the point of attack, and the victory of Rivoli decided virtually the whole campaign. This corresponded in principle with Napoleon’s general plan in battle. He formed his attack into column, tried to break through the centre of the enemy’s line; and if he succeeded, then doubled back to one side, so as to concentrate the whole of his own force against one-half of the enemy’s, which was usually routed before the other half of the line could come up to the rescue. Taken collectively, the tactics of the three arms may thus be summarized: The infantry form the line of battle, and probably decide the day by a general advance over the enemy’s ground. The cavalry seek to break the opposing infantry by frequent charges in front, or on any flank which may be left exposed. If a part of the line wavers, a charge of horse should complete the disarray. When the rout commences, the cavalry should turn it by furious onslaught into utter discomfiture. The province of the artillery is to cannonade any portion of the line where men are ma ed, or where a charge is about to be made; to demoralize cavalry, and generally to carry destruction wherever it can best disconcert the enemy. Adverting now very briefly to the tactics of the several arms individually, we have—