Philosophy

is a word derived from. the Greek, which literally signifies the love of wisdom, In its usual acceptation, however, it denotes a science or collection of sciences, of which the universe is the object; and ef the term thus employed many definitions have been given, differing from one another according to the different views of their several authors. By Pythagoras, philosophy is defined emalnjzn twv ovluy, *‘the knowledge of things existing;” by Cicero, after Plato, sczentia rerum divinarum et human arum cum causis; and by the illustrious Bacon, interpret atéo nature. Whether any of these definitions be sufficiently precise, and at the same time sufficiently comprehensive, may be questioned; but if philosophy in its utmost extent be capable of being gdequately defined, it is not here that the definition should be given. “ Explanation, ” says an acute writer, (Tatham) is the first office of a teacher; definition, if it be good, is the last of the inquirer after truth; but explanation is one thing, and definition quite another.” It may be proper, however, to observe, that the definition given by Cicero is better than that of Pythagoras, because the chief object of the philosopher is to ascertain the causes of things; and in this consists the difference between his studies and the natural historian, who merely enumerates phenomena, and arranges them into separate cla es, The principal objects of philosophy are, God, nature, and man.. That part of it which treats of God is called theology; that which treats of nature, physics, and metaphysics; and that which treats of man, logic and ethics. These are not separate and independent sciences, but, as Bacon expre es it, branches from the same trunk. The universe, that unbounded object of the contemplation, the curiosity and the researches of man, may be considered in two different points of view. In the first place, it may be considered merely as a collection of existences, related to each other by means of resemblances and distinction, situation, succe ion, and derivation, as making parts of awhole. In this view it is the subject of pure description. To acquire an acquaintance with, or a knowlede of, the universe in this point of view, we must enumerate all the beings in it, mention all their sensible qualities, and mark all these relations for each. But this would be labour immense; and, when done, an undistinguishable chaos. A book containing every word of a language would only give us the materials, so to speak, of this language. To make it comprehensible, it must be put into some form, which will comprehend the whole in a small compa , and enable the mind to pa easily from one word to another related to it. Of all relations among words, the most obvious are those of resemblance and derivation. An etymological dictionary, therefore, in which words are cla ed in consequence of their resemblances, and arranged by means of their de- ¥ rivative distinctions, will greatly facilitate the aoquisition of the language. mah Just so in nature: the objects around us may be grouped by means of their resemblance, and then arranged in those groups by means of their distinctions and other relations. In this cla ification we are enabled to proceed by means of our faculty of abstracting our at tef it i on from the circumstances in which things differ, and turning it to those only in which they agree. By the judicious employment of this faculty, we are able not only to’ distribute the individuals into cla es, but also to distribute those cla es into others still more comprehensive, by discovering circumstances of resemblance among them: for, the fewer the circumstances are which concur to form that resemblance which has engaged our attention, the greater is the number of di imilar circumstances which are neglected; and the more’ extensive will be the cla of individuals in which the resemblance is observed. Thus, a number of individuals resembling each other in the single circumstance of life, composes the most extensive kingdom of animals. If it be required that they shall further resemble in the circumstance of having feathers, a prodigious number of animals are excluded, and we form the inferjor claws of birds. We exclude a great number of birds, by requiring a further similarity of web feet, and have the order of’ an- SEVES.” If we add lingua citiata, we confine the attention to the genus of anates. In this manner be may the whole objects of the universe be grouped, | and arranged inte kingdoms, cla es, orders, ge~ nera, and species. Such a cla ification and arrangement is called* natural ‘history; and must be considered as the only foundation of any extensive knowledge of nature. To the natural historian, therefore, the world is a collection of existences, the subject of descriptive arrangement. His aim is threefold. 1. To observe with care, and describe with ac-' curacy, the various objects of the universe. 2. To determine and enumerate all the great cla es of objects; to distribute and arrange them, into all their subordinate cla es, through all degrees of subordination, till he arrive at what are only accidental varieties, which are susceptible of no farther distribution; and to mark witb precision the principles of this distribution and arrangement, and the characteristics of the various a emblages. 3. ‘To determine with certainty the particular group to which any proposed individual belongs. Description therefore, arrangement, and refer-: ence, constitute the whole of his employment; and in this consists all bis science. Did the universe continue unchanged, this would constitute the whole of our knowledge of nature: but we are witne es of an uninterrupted succe ion of changes, and our attention is continually called to the events which are ince antly happening around us. These form a set of objects vastly more interesting to us than the formers being the sources of almost all the pleasures or pains we receive from external objects. _ We are therefore much interested in the study of the events which happen around us, and strongly. incited to prosecute it: but they are so numerous and so multifarious, that the study would be im-~ mense, without some contrivance for abbreviating and facilitating the task. The same’ help offers itself here as in the study of what may be called quiescent nature. Events, like existences, are susceptible of cla ification, in consequence of resemblances and distinction; and by attention to these, we can acquire a very extensive acquaintance with active nature. Our attention must be chiefly directed to those circumstances in which many events resemble each other, while they dif-' fer perhaps in a you sand others. Then we must. attend to their most general distinctions; then to distinctions of smaller extent, and so on..- Itis in this way accordingly that we have ade vanced in our knowledge of active nature, and are gradually, and by no means slowly, forming a emblages of events more and more extensive, and distributing these with greater and greater precision into their different cla es. In the zealous and attentive prosecution of this task, a very remarkable and interesting observation occurs. In describing those circumstances of similarity among events, and particularly in distributing them according to those similarities, it is im= po ible for us to overlook that constancy which is observed in the changes of nature in the events which are the objects of.our contemplation. Events. which have once been observed to accompany each other are observed always to do so. The rising of the sun is always accompanied by the light of day, — and his setting by the darkne of night, Sound argument is accompanied by conviction, impulse by motion, kindne by a feeling of gratitude, and the perception of good by desire.. The unexcepted experience of mankind informs.us, that the events of nature go on in certain regular trains; and if sometimes exceptions seem to contradict this general affirmation, more attentive observation never fails to remove the exception. Most of the spontaneous events of nature are very complicated; and it frequently requires great attention and penetration to discover the simple event amidst a crowd of une ential circumstances which are at once exhibited to our view.. But when we succeed in this discovery, we never fail to acknowledge thé perfect uniformity of the event to what has been formerly observed. But this is not all: we firmly believe that this dniformity will still continue; that fire will melt wax, will burn paper, will harden clay, as we have formerly observed it to do: and whenever we have undoubted proofs that the circumstances of situation are precisely the same asin some fermer case, though but once observed, we expect with irresistible and unshaken confidence that the event will also be the same, It is not surely nece ary to adduce many proofs of the universality of this law of human thought. The whole language and actions of men are instances of the fact. In all languages there is a mode of construction which is used to expre this relation as distinct from all others, and the conversation of the most illiterate never confounds them, except when the conceptions themseives are confounded. The general employment of active and pa ive verb is regulated by it. Turris eversa est a militibus; turris eversa est terre motu, expre two relations, and no schoolboy will confound them. The distinction therefore is pereeived or felt by all who can speak grammatically. Nor is any language without general terms to expre this relation, cause—effect—to occasion. Nay, it is a fact in the mind of brutes, who hourly show that they expect the same uses of every subject which they formerly made of it; and without this, animals would be incapable of subsistence, and man incapable of all improvement. From this alone memory derives all its value; and even the constancy. of natural operation would be usele , if not matched or adapted to our purposes by this expectation of and confidence in that constancy. After all the labours of ingenious men to discover the foundation of this irresistible expectation, we must be contented with saying that such is the constitution of the human mind. It is an universal fact in human thought; and for any ‘thing that has been yet discovered, it is an ultimate fact, not included in any other still more general. We shall soon see that this is sufficient for making it the foundation of true human knowledge; all of which must in like manner be reduced to ultimate facts in human thought. We must consider this undoubted feeling, this persuasion of the constancy of nature, as an instinctive anticipation of events silnilar to those which we have already experienced. The general analogy of nature should have disposed philo- sophers to acquiesce in this, however unwelcome to their vanity. In no instance of e ential con- sequence to our safety or well-being are we left to the guidance of our boasted reason: God has given us the surer conduct of natural instincts. _ No case is so important as this: in none do we so much stand in need of a guide which shall be pow- erful, infallible, and rapid in its decisions. With- out it we must remain incapable of all instruction from experience, and therefore of all improve- ment, Our sensations are undoubtedly feelings of own» mind. But all those feelings are accompanied by an instinctive reference of them to something distinct from the feelings themselves. Hence arises our perception of external objects, and our very notions of this externeity {pardon the term), like manner, this anticipation of events, this irresistibie connection of the idea of fire with the idea of burning, is also a feeling of the mind: and this feeling is by a law of human nature referred, without reasoning, to something external as its cause; and, like our sensation, it is considered as a sign of that external something, It is like the convietion of the truth of a mathematical proposition. This is referred by us to something existing in nature, to a nece ary and eternal relation subsisting between the ideas which are the subjects of the proposition. The conviction is the sign or indication of this relation by which it is brought to our view. dn precisely the same manner, the irresistible connection of ideas is interpreted as the sensation or sign of a nece ary: connection of external things or events,. These are supposed to include something in their nature which renders. them inseparable companions. To this bond of connection between external things we give the name of causation, All our knowledge of this relation of cause and effect, is the knowledge or'consciousne of what pa es in our own minds during the contemplation of the phenomena of nature. If we adhere to this view of it, and put this branch of knowledge on the same footing with those cailed the abstract sciences, considering only the relations of ideas, we shall require demonstrative science. Ifwe take any other view of the matter, we shall be led into inextricable mazes of uncer. tainty and error. We see then, that the natural procedure of our faculty of abstraction and arrangement, in order to acquire a more speedy and comprehensive knowledge of natural events, presents them to our view in another form. We not only see them as similar events, but as events naturally and neces-_ sarily conjoined. And the expre ion of resemblance among events is also an expre ion of concomitancy; and this arrangement of events in consequence of their resemblance is in fact the discovery of those accompaniments. The trains of natural appearance being considered as the appointments of the Author of Nature, has occasioned them to be considercd also as consequences of laws imposed on his works by their great author, and every thing is said to be regulated by fixed laws. But this is the language of analogy.’ When’ a sovereign determines on certain trains of conduct for his subjects, he i ues his orders. These orders are laws. He inforces the observance of them by his authority;and thus a certain regularity and constancy of conduct is produced. But should a stranger, ignorant of the promulgation of these laws, and of the exerted authority of the magistrate, observe this uniformity of conduct, he would ascribe it to the genius and disposition of. the people; and his observation would be as useful to him for directing the tenor of his own conduct, as the knowledge of the subject-+himself of the real source of this con- stancy is for directing his. Just so in nature, while the theologian pretends, from his discoveries concerning the existence and super intendance of God, to know that the constant accompaniment of events ig the-consequence of laws which the Great Author and Governor of the universe has imposed on his works, the ordinary philosopher, a strapger to this scene, and to the wnsearchable operations of the suPpREME MIND, must ascribe this constancy to the nature of the things. There is a great resemblance between the expre ion matural law and grammatical rule. Rule in's trict language implies command; but in grammar it expre es merely a generality of fact, whether of flexion or construction. In like manher, a law of nature is to the philosopher nothing but the expre ion of a generality of fact. natural or physical law is a generally observed fact; and whenever we treat any subject asa generally observed fact, we treat it physically. is.a physical law of the understanding that argument is accompanied by conviction; it isa physical law of the affection that distre is accompanied by pity; it isa physical law of the material world that impulse is accompanied by motion. And thus we see that the arrangement of events, or the discovery of those general points of resemblance, is in fact the discovery of the laws of nature; and one of the greatest and most important is, that the laws of nature are constant, There is no question that this view of the universe is incomparably more interesting and important than that which is taken by the natural historian; contemplating every thing that is of value to us, and, in short, the whole life and movement of the universe. This study, therefore, has been dignified with the name of philosophy and of science; and natural history has been considered as of importance only in so far as it was conducive to the succe ful prosecution of philo- Sophy. But the philosopher claims a superiority on another account; he considers himself as employed in the discovery of causes, saying that philosophy is the study of the objects of the universe as related by causation, and that it is by the discovery of these relations that he communicates to the world such important knowledge. Philosophy, he Says, is the science of causes. The vulgar are contented to consider the prior of two inseparably conjoined events as the cause of the others the stroke on a bell, for instance, as the cause of sound. But it has been clearly shown by the philosopher, that between the blow on the bell and the sensation of sound there are interposed a long train of events. The blow sets the bell {a trembling; this agitates the air in contact with the _ bell; this agitates the air immediately beyond it; and thus between the bell and the ear may be interposed a numberle series of events, and as many more between the first impre ion on the ear and that last impre ion on the nerve by which the mind is affected. He can no longer therefore follow the nomenclature of the vulgar. Which of the events of this train therefore is the cause of this sensation? none of them: it is that something which inseparably connects any two of them, and constitutes their bond of union. These bonds of union or causes he considers as residing in one or both of the connected objects: diversities in this respect must therefore constitute the most important distinctions between them. They are. therefore with great propriety called the qualities, the properties, of these respective subjects. _ As the events from which we infer the existence of these qualities of things resemble in many respects such events as are the consequences of the €xertion of our own,.powers, these qualities are frequently denominated powers, forces, energies. Thus, in the instance just now given of the sound of a bell, we infer the powers of impulse, elasticity, nervous irritability, and animal sensibility. in consequence of this inference of a nece ary — connection between the objects around us, we not only infer the posterior event from the prior, or, in common language, the effect from the cause, but we also infer the prior from the posterior, the cause from the effect. We not only expect that the presence of a magnet will be followed by certain motions in iron-filings, but, when we observe such motions, we infer the presence and agency of a magnet. Joy is inferred from merriment, poison from death, fire from smoke, and impulse from motion. And thus the appearances of the universe are the indications of the powers of the objects in Appearances are the language of nature, ine forming us of their causes. _ And as all our knowledge of the sentiments of others is derived from our confidence in their veracity; so all our knowledge of nature is derived from our confidence in the constancy of natural operations. A veracity and credulity nece arily resulting from that law of our mental constitution by which we are capable of speech, conduct us in the one case; and the constancy of nature, and the principle of induction, by which we infer general laws from pars ticular facts, conduct us in the other. As human sentiment is inferred from language, and the existence of external things from sensation; so are the laws of nature, and the powers of natural objects, inferred from the phenomena. — It is by the succe ful study of this language of nature that we derive useful knowledge. The knowledge of the influence of motives on the mind of man enables the statesman to govern kingdoms, and the knowledge of the powers of magnetism enables the mariner to pilot aship through the pathle ocean. Such are the lofty pretensions of philosophy. It is to be wished that they be well founded; for we may be persuaded that a mistake in this particular will be fatal to the advancement of knowledge. An author of great reputation gives us an opportunity of deciding this question in the way of experiment. He says that the ancients were philosophers, employed in the discovery of causes, and that the moderns are only natural historians, contenting themselves with observing the laws of nature, but paying no attention to the causes of things. Ifhe speaks of their profe ed aim, we apprehend that the a ertion is pretty just in general, With very few exceptions, indeed, it may beaffiirmed of his favourite Aristotle, the philosopher xar eZoyuv, and of sir Isaac Newton. We select these two instances, both because they are set in continual opposition by this author, and because it will be allowed that they were the most eminent students of nature (for we must not yet call them philosophers) in ancient and modern times. Aristotle’s profe ed aim, in his most celebrated writings, is the investigation of causes; and in the opinion of this author, he-has been so succe ful that he has hardly left any employment for his succe ors beside that of commenting upon his works. We must on the other hand acknowledge that Newton makes no such pretensions, at least in that work which has immortalised his name, and that his profe ed aim is merely to investigate the general laws of the planetary-motions, and to apply these to the explanation of particular phenomena. Nor will we say that he has left no employment for succeeding enquirers; but, on the contrary, confe that he has only begun the study, has discovered: but one Jaw, and has enabled us to explain only the phenomena comprehended in it alone. But he has not been unsucce ful; his investigation bas been complete; and he has disco ye red beyond all po ibility of contradiction a fact which is observed through the whole extent of the solar system;. namely, that every body, nay that every particle in it, is continually deflected toward évery other body; and that this deflection is, in every instance, proportional to the quantity of matter in that body toward which the deflection is directed, and to the reciprocal of the square of the distance from it. He has therefore discovered a physical law of immense extent. Nor kas he been le succe ful in the explanation of particular phenomena. Of this there cannot be given a better instance than the explanation of the lunar motions from the theory of gravity begun by Newton “ Mathest sua facem preferente;” and now brought to such a degree of perfection, that if the moon’s place be computed from it for any moment within the period of two thousard years back, it will not be found to differ from the place on which she was actually observed by one hundredth part of her own breadth. -“ Discimus hinc tandem qua causa argentea Phoebe Pa ibus haud equis graditur; cur, subdita null i Hactenus astronomo, numerorum frena recuset. . Que toties animos veterum torsere sophorum, Quzeque scholas frustva rauco cert a mine vexant, Obvia conspicimus, nubem pellente mathesi; . Qua superos penetrare domos, et ardua ceeli Newton i a us pic i is jam dat contingere tempi a.” We may now desire the champions of the science of causes to name any one cause which has really been discovered by their great master, whether in the operations of mind or of body. But they must not on this occasion adduce the investigation of any natural law in which he has sometimes succeeded. ‘With still greater confidence may we challenge them to produce any remarkable instance of the explanation of natural phenomena either of mind or body. By explanation, we mean an account of the production, and an apprecia- tion of all the circumstances, susceptible of a scrupulous comparison with fact, and perfectly consistent with it. It is here that the weakne of this philosopher’s pretensions is most conspi- cuous; and his followers candidly acknowledge, that in the enquiries which proceed by experiment, we have not derived great a istance from Aris- totle’s philosophy. But this, say they, does not derogate from the pre-eminence of his philosophy, because he has shown that the particular fields of observation are to be cultivated only by means of experiment. But surely every field of observation is particular. There is no abstract object of phi- losophical research, the study of which shall ter- minate in the philosophy of universals. In every kind of enquiry, that cause alone must be sup- posed to act which we understand so far as to be able to appreciate its effects in particular circum- stances, and compare them with fact, and see their perfect coincidence. If we have discovered causes, they are known as far as they are discovered. Their genuine effects are known, and therefore the phenomena which result from their agency are understood. When therefore it is acknowledged, as it must be acknowledged, that mankind have made but little advances in the knowledge of na- ture, notwithstanding the pretended discovery of eauses by Aristotle, and the conducting clue of his philosophy, till of late years; and when it-is also: allowed that now, while we are e’ery day making great additions to this subordinale knowledge, the causes which Aristotle has discovered are for gotten, and his philosoyhy ig neglected; there is great room for suspeting (to say the least), that either the causes whch philosophy pretends to have discovered are n¢ real, or that Aristotle and his followers have nolaimed at the discovery of causes, but only at te discovery of natural laws, and have failed in th\ attempt. There seems here to be a previous question: Is it po ible to discover a phipsophical cause, that something which is neithe| the prior nor the posterior of the two immedizely adjoining events, but their bond of union, and bis distinct from the union itself? It is evident tht this is an enquiry purely experimental. It is dq human knowledge we speak. This must depend\n the nature of the human mind. This is a mattr of contingency, known to us only by experimet and observation. By observing all the feelings an operations of the mind, and cla ing and arrangng them like any other object of science, we ditover the general laws of human thought and hump reasoning; and this is all the knowledge we can}ver acquire of it, or of any thing else. Much has been written on ths subject. The most acute observation and soun\ judgment have been employed in the study: and we may venture to say, that considerable progresghas been nade in pneumatology. Many laws of human thojght have been observed, and very distinc:ly marled and philosophers are busily employed, som\ of them with considerable succe , in the dis tri but on of them into subordinate cla es, so as to knw their comparative extent, and to mark their tinguishing characters with a precision similar \o what has been attained in botany and other pais of natural history; so that we may hope that th, study will advance like others. But in all i researches, no phenomena have occurred whic look like the perception or contemplation of thes| separate objects of thought, these philosophic a causes, this power in abstracto. No philosophe has ever pretended to state such an object of th mind’s observation, or attempted to group the into cla es. We may say at once, without entering into any detail, that those causes, those bonds of nece ary: union between the naturally conjoined events or | objects, are not only perceived by means of the \ events alone, but are peréeived solely in the events, and cannot be distinguished from the conjunctions themselves. They are neither the objects of se- | parate observation, nor the productions of me- mory, nor inferences drawn from reflection on the laws by which the operations of our minds are regulated; nor can they be derived from other | perceptions in the way of argumentative inference. We cannot infer the paroxysm of terror from the appearance of impending destruction, nor the fall of a stone when not supported, as we infer the in- commensurability of the diagonal and side of a square, ‘This last is implied in the very concep= tion or notion of a square; not as a consequence of its other properties, but as one of its e ential attributes; and the contrary proposition is not only false, but incapable of being distinctly con- ceived. This is not the case with the other phe- no men on, or any matter of fact. The proofs which are brought of a mathematical proposition, are not the reason of its being true, but the steps by which this truth is brought into our view; and fre- quently, as-in the instance now given, this trath is perceived, not drectly, but consequentially, by the inconceivable e of the contrary proposi- tion. Mr. Hume derives this irresistible expectation of events from the known effect of custom, the as- sociation of ideas. The or elated event is brought into the mind by this wll-known power of cus- tom, with that vivacity f° conception which con- stitutes belief or expectzion. But without insisting on the futility of his thory of belief, it is sufficient to observe, that this:xplanation begs the very thing to be proved, wen it ascribes to custom a power of any kind, {tis the origin of this very power which is the sject in dispute, Besides, on the genuine princip’s of scepticism, this custom involves an acknowedgment of past events, of a something differen from present impre ions, which, in this doctrie (if doctrine it can be called), are the only certs existences in nature: and, lastly, it is known that one clear experience isa sufficient found at i a for this unshaken confidence and anticipation. General custom can never, on Mr. Hume’s prinqples, give superior vivacity to any particular ide. This certain naentity of it as a separate object of observation, ad this impo ibility to derive this notion of nece ay and causal connection between the events of th universe from any source, have induced two of the most acute philosophers of Eurove, Mr, Leibuitz and Father Male bran che, to dmy that there is any such connection, and to a et that the events of the universe go on in cor- res-Onding trains, but without any causal connec- tial, just as'a well-regulated clock will keep time: wih the motions of the heavens without any kind oflependence on them.. This harmony of events ws pre-established by the Author of the universe, i subserviency to the purposes he had in view in is formation. All those purposes which are cognisable by us, may certainly be accomplished by this perfect a dust ment. But without insisting on the fantastic vildne of this ingenious whim, it is quite enough: © observe, that it also is a, begging of the question, yecause it supposes causation when it ascribes all to the agency of the Deity. Thus have we searched every quarter, without being able to find a source from which to derive this perception of a nece ary connection among the events of the universe, or of this confident ex- ‘pectation of the continuance of physical laws; and | yet we are certain of the feeling, and of the persuasion, be its origin what it may: for we speak. intelligibly on this subject; we speak familiarly of cause, eftect, power, energy, nece ary connection, motives and their influence, argument and convic= tion, reasons and persuasion, allurements and* emotions, of gravity, magnetism, irritability, .; and we carry on conversations on these subjects with much entertainment and seeming instruction. Language is the expre ion of thought, and every word expre es some notion or conception of the mind; therefore it must be allowed that we have such notions as are expre ed;by cause, power, energy. But it is here, as in many Cases, we perceive a distinction without being able to expre it by a definition; and that we do perceive the relation of causation as distinct from, all others, and in particular as distinct from the relation of contiguity in time and place; or the relation of agent, action, and patient, must be concluded from the uniformity of language, which never confounds them except on purpose, and when it is perceived.. But even here we shall find, that none. of the terms used for expre ing those powers of substance: which are conceived as the causes of their cha-) racteristic phenomena really expre any thing: different from the phenomena themselves, Let any person try to define the terms gravity, elasticity, sensibility, and the like, and he will find that the definition is nothing but a description of the phenomenon itself. The words are all derivatives, most of them verbal derivatives, implying action, gravitation, . As the general resemblances in shape, colour, . are expre ed by the. natural historian by generic terms, so the general resemblances in event are expre ed by the philosopher in generic propositions, which, in the: progre of cultivation, are also abbreviated into generic terms. This abundantly explains the consistency of our language on this subject, both with itself and with the operations of nature, without however affording any argument for the truth of the a umption, that causes are the object of philosophic research as separate existences; or that this supposed nece ary connection is a nece ary truth, whether: supreme or subordinate. But since the perception of it has its foundation in the constitution of the human mind, it.seems entitled to the name of a first principle. We are hardly allowed to doubt of this, when we consider the importance of it, and the care of nature to secure us in all things e ential to our safety and well-being, from all danger, from inattention, ignorance, or indolence, by an instinct infallible in its information, and instantaneous in its decisions, ‘‘It would not be like her usual care (says Hume), if this operation of the mind, by which we infer like effects from like causes, and vice vers a, were entrusted to the fallacious: deduction of our reason, which is slow in its operations, appears not in any degree during the first: years of infancy, and in every age and period of: human life is extremely liable to error. It is more conformable to her ordinary caution (mark the acknowledgment) to secure so nece ary an act of the mind by some instinct, or blind tendency, which may be infallible and rapid in all its operations, may discover itself at the first appearance’ of life, and may be independent of all the laboured deductions of reason. As she has taught us the use of our limbs, without giving us any knowledge. of the nerves and muscles by which they are actuated; so she has implanted in us an instinct, which carries forward the thought in a course conformable to that established among external objects, though we be ignorant of the powers and. forces on which this regularity depends.” Such a knowledge is quite unnece ary, and therefore causes are no more cognoscible by our intellectual powers than colours by a man born blind; nay, whoever will be at the pains to consider this matter agreeably to the, received rules and maxims of logic, will find that nece ary connection, or the bond of causation, can no more be the subject of philosophical discu ion by man, than the ultimate nature of truth. Itis precisely the same absurdity or incongruity, as to propose to examine light with a microscope. Other rational creatures may perceive them as easily as we hear sounds. All that we can say is, that their existence is probable, but by no means certain, Nay, it may be (and we never know it) that we are not the efficient causes of our own actions, which may be effected by the Deity or by ministering. spirits; and this may even be true in the material world.. But all this is indifferent to the rea] occupation of the philosopher, and does not affect either the certainty, the extent, or the utility of the knowledge which he may acquire. We are now able to appreciate the high pretensions of the philosopher, and his claim to scientific superiority. We now see that this can neither be founded on any scientific superiority of his object, nor of his employment. His object is not’ causes; and his discoveries are nothing but the discovery of general facts, the discovery of physical laws; and his employment is the same with that of the descriptive historian. He observes and describes with care and accuracy the events of nature; and then he groups them into cla es, in’ consequence of resembing circumstances, detected in the midst of many others which are di imilar and occasional. By gradually throwing ont more circumstances of resemblance, renders cla es more extensive; and, by carefully marking those circumstances in which the resemblance is observed, he characterises ai] the different cla es: and, by a comparison of. these with each other, in respect to the number of resembling circumstances, he distributes his cla es according to their generality and subordination; thus exhausting the whole a emblage, and leaving nothing’ unarranged but accidental varieties. In this procedure it is to be remarked, that every grouping of similar events is, ipso facto, discovering a general fact, a physical law; and the expre ion of this a emblage is the expre ion of the physical law, And as every observation of this constancy of fact affords an opportunity for exerting the instinctive inference of natural connection between the related subjects, every such observation is the discovery of a power, property, or quality, of natural substance. And from what has been said, this observation of event is all we know of the connection, all we know of “the natural power. And when the philosopher proceeds further to the arrangement of events, according to their various degrees of complication, he is, ipso facto, making an arrangement of all natural powers according to their various degrees of subordinate influence. And thus his occupation is perfectly similar to that of the descriptive historian, Cla ification and arrangement; and this constitutes all the science attainable by both. Philosophy may therefore be defined the study of the phenomena of the universe, with a view to discover the general laws which indicate the powers of natural substances, to explain subordinate phenomena, and to improve art: or, in compliance with that natural instinct so much spoken of; philosophy is the study of the phenomena of the universe, with a view to discover their causes, to explain subordinate phenomena, and to improve art. The task is undoubtedly difficult, and will exercise our noblest powers. The employment is manly in itself,and the result of it important. therefore justly. merits the appellation of philo- sophy, although its objects are nowise different from what occupy the attention of other men. [tis in experimental philosophy alone that hypo- theses can have any just claim to admi ion; and here they are not admitted as explanations, but as conjectures serving to” direct our line of experi- meuts. Effects only appear; and by their appearance, and the previous information of experience, causes are immediately ascertained by the perfect si- milarity of the whole train of events to other trains formerly observed: or they are suggested by more imperfect resemblances of the phenomena; and these suggestions are made with stronger or fainter evidence, according as the resemblance is more or le perfect. These suggestions do not amount to a confidential inference, and only raise a conjecs° ture. Wishing to verify or overturn this conjecture, we have recourse to experiment; and we put the subject under consideration in such a situation, that we can say what will be the effect of the conjectural cause if real. “If this tallies with the appearance, our conjecture has more probability of truth, and we vary the situation, which will produce a new set of effects of the conjectured cause, and so on. It is evident that the probability of: our conjecture will increase with the increase of the conformity of the legitimate effects of the supposed cause with the phenomena, and that it will. be entirely destroyed by one disagreement. The sphere of our intuitive knowledge is very limited; and we must be indebted for the greatest part of our intellectual attainments to our rational powers, and it must be deductive, In the spontaneous phenomena of nature, whether of mind or body, it seldom happens that the energy of that natural power which is the principle of explanation is so immediately connected with the pheno- *men a that we see the connection at once, exertions are frequently concealed, and: in ‘all cases modified, by the joint exertions of other natural powers: the particular exertion of cach must be considered apart, and their connection traced out. It is only in this way that we can discover the perhaps long train of intermediate operations, and also see in what manner and degree the real principle of explanation concurs in the ostensible proce of nature. In all such cases it is evident that our investigation (and investigation it most strictly is) must proceed by steps, conducted by the sure hand of logical method. As an instance selected from the material world, we may state Galileo’s explanation of the cause of the rise of water in a pump. says it is owing to the pre ure of the air: that is his principle, and he announces it in all its extent. All matter, says he, is heavy, and in particular air is heavy. He then points out the connection of this general principle with the phenomenon. The rise of the water in the pump is shown to bea particular case of the general fact in hydrostatics that fluids in communicating ve els will stand at heights which are inversely as their densities, or that columns of equal weights are in equilibrio. This way of proceeding is called arguing 4@ prior i, the synthetic method. It is founded on just principles; and the great progre which we have made in the mathematical sciences by this mode of reasoning shows to what length it may be carried with irresistible evidence. It has long been considered as the only inlet to true knowledge; and nothing was allowed to be known with certainty which could not be demonstrated in this way to betrue. Accordingly logic, or the art of reasoning, which wasal!so called the art of discovering truth, was nothing but a set of rules for suc- ce fully conducting this mode of argument. Under the direction of this infallible guide, it is not surely unreasonable to expect that philosophy has made sure progre towards perfection: and as we know that the brightest. geniuses of Athens and of Rome were for ages solely occupied in philosophical researches in every path of human know- ~ ledge, it is equa!ly reasonable to suppose that the progre has not only been sure but great. We have seen that the explanation of an appearance in nature is nothing but the arrangement of it into that general cla in which it was comprehended, The cla has its distinguished mark, which, when it is found in the phenomenon under consideration, fixes it in its cla , there to remain for ever an addition to our stock of knowledge. The Aristo tel i an logic, the syllegistic art, that art so much boasted of as the only inlet to true knowledge, the only means of discovery, is in direct opposition to the ordinary procedure of nature, by which we every day, and in every action of our lives, acquire knowledge and discover truth. It is not the art of discovering truth, it is the art of communicating knowledge, and of detecting error: it is nothing more than the, application of this maxim, ‘*‘ Whatever is true of a whole cla of objects, is true of each individual of that cla .” This is not a just account of the art of discovering truth, nor is ita complete account of the art of reasoning, Reasoning is the producing belief; and whatever mode of argumentation invariably and irresistibly produces belief, is reasoning. The ancient logic supposes that all the first principles are already known, and that nothing is wanted but the application of them to particular facts. But were this true, the application of them, as we have -already observed, can hardly be called a discovery; but it is not true; and the fact is, that the first principles are generally the chief objects of our research, and that they have come into view only now and then as it were by accident, and never by the labour of the logician. He indeed can tell us whether we have been mistaken; for, if our general ' principle be true, it must influence every particular case. If, therefore, it be false in any one of these, it is not a true principle. And it is here that we discover the source of that fluctuation which is so much complained of in philosophy. The authors of systems give a set of consecutive propositions logically deduced from a first principle, which has been hastily adopted, and has no foundation nature. This does not hinder the amusement of framing a system from it, nor this system from pleasing by its symmetry; and it takes a run: but when some officious follower thinks of making some use of it, which requires the comparison with experience and observation, they are found totally unlike, and the whole fabric must be abandoned as unsound: and thus the succe ive systems were continually pushing out their predece ors, and presently met with the same treatment. How was this to be remedied? The ratiocination was seldom egregiously wrong; the syllogistic art had ere now attained a degree of perfection which left little room for improvement, and was so familiarly understood by the philosophical practitioners, that they seldom committed any great blunders. Must we examine the first principles? This was a task quite new in science; and there were hardly any rules in the received systems of logic to direct us to the succe ful performance of it. Aristotle, the sagacious inventor of those rules, had not totally omitted it; but in the fervour of philosephic speculation he had made little use of them. His fertile genius never was at a lo for first principles, which answered the purpose of verbal disquisition without much risk of being belied on account of its di imilitude to nature; for there was frequently no. prototype with which his systematic doctrine could be compared. His enthusiastic followers found abundant amusement in following his example; and philosophy, no longer in the hands of men acquainted with the world, conversant in the great book of nature, was now confined almost entirely to recluse monks, equally ignorant of men and-of things, But curiosity was awakened, and the men of genius were fretted as well as disgusted with the disquisitions of the schools, which one moment raised expectations, by the symmetry of composition, and the next moment blasted them by their inconsistency with experience. They saw that the best way was to begin de novo, to throw away the first principles altogether, without exception or examination, and endeavour to find out new ones, which would stand the test of logic; that is, should in every case be agreeable to fact, Philosophers began to reflect, that under the unnoticed tuition of kind nature we have acquired much useful knowledge. [t is therefore highly probable, that her method is the most proper for acquiring knowledge, and that by imitating her manner we shall have the like succe . We are toe apt to slight the occupations of children, whom we may observe continually busy, turning every thing over and over, putting them into every situation, and at every distance, We excuse it, saying that it is an innocent amusement; but we should say, with an ingenious philosopher (Dr. Reid), that they are most seriously and rationally employed: they are acquiring the habits of observation; and by merely indulging an undetermined curiosity, they are making themselves acquainted with surrounding objects; they are struck by similitudes, and amused with mere cla ification. some new effect. occurs from any of their little plays, they are eager to repeat it. When a child has for the first time tumbled a spoon from the table, and is pleased with its jingling noise on the floor, if another lies within its reach, it is sure to share the same fate. If the child is indulged in this diversion, it will repeat it with a greedine that deserves our attention. The very first eager repetition shows a confidence in the constancy of natural operations, which we can hardly ascribe wholly to experience; and its keenne to repeat the experiment shows the interest which it takes in the exercise of this most useful propensity. is beginning the study of nature; and its occupation is the same with that of a Newton comparing the motions of the moon by his sublime theory, - and comparing his calculus with observation. The child and the philosopher are equally employed in the contemplation of a similarity of event, and are anxious that this similarity shall return. The child, it is true, thinks not of this abstract object of contemplation, but throws down the spoon again to have the pleasure of hearing it jingle. The philosopher suspects that the conjunction of events is the consequence of a general law of nature, and tries an experiment where this conjunction recurs, The child is happy and eager to enjoy a pleasure which to us appears highly frivolous; but’ has the same foundation with the pleasure of the philosopher, who rejoices in the succe of his experiment; and the fact, formerly a trifle to both, now acquires importance. Both go on repeating the experiment till the fact ceases to be a novelty to either: the child is satisfied, and the philosopher has now established a new law of nature. Such (says this amiable philosopher) is the education of kind nature, who from the beginning to the end of our lives makes the play of her scholars their most instructive le ons, and has implanted in our mind the curiosity and the inductive propensity by which we are enabled and disposed to learn them. The exercise of this inductive principle, by which nature prompts us to infer general Jaws from the observation of particular facts, gives us a species of logic new in the schools, but old as human nature, It is certainly a method of disco very; for by these means general principles, formerly unknown, have come into view. It isa just and rational logic, for it is founded on, and indeed is only the habitual application of, this maxim, ‘** That whatever is true with respect to every individual of a cla of events, is true of the whole cla .” This is just the inverse of the maxim on which the Aristotelian logic wholly proceeds, and is of equal authority in the court of reason. Indeed the expre ion of the general law is only the abbreviated expre ion of every particular instance, See INDUCTION. Philosophy has been divided into two branches, or considered under two circumstances, theoretical and practical. Theoretical or speculative philosophy is employed in mere contemplation. Such is physics, which is a bare contemplation of nature, and natural things. Theoretical philosophy again is usually subdivided into three kinds, viz. pneumatics, physics, or somatics, and metaphysics or ontology. The first considers being, abstractedly from_all matter: its objects are spirits, their natures, properties, and effects. The second considers matter, and material things: its objects are bodies, their / properties, laws, . The third extends to each indifferently: its objects are body or spirit. In the order of our discovery, or arrival at the knowledge of them, physics is first, then metaphysics; the last arises from the two first considered together. But in teaching, or laying down these several branches to others, we observe a contrary order; beginning with the most universal, and descending to the more particular. And hence we see why the Peripatetics call metaphysics, and the Cartesians pneumatics, the prima philosophia. Others prefer the distribution of philosophy into four parts, viz. 1. Pneumatics, which considers and treats of spirits. 2. Somatics, of bodies. The third compounded of both, anthropology, which considers man, in whom both body and spirit are found. 4, Ontosophy, which treats of what is common to all the other three. Again, philosophy may be divided into three parts; intellectual, moral and physical: the intellectual part comprises logic and metaphysics; the moral part contains the Jaws of nature and nations, ethics and politics; and lastly the physical part comprehends the doctrine of bodies, animate or inanimate: these, with their various subdivisions, will comprize the whole of philosophy. Practical philosophy is that which lays down the rules of a virtuous and happy life, and excites us to the practice of them. Most authors divide it inte two kinds, answerable to the two sorts of human actions to be directed by it; viz. logic, which governs the operations of the understanding; and ethics, properly so called, which direct those of the will, For the several particular sorts of philosophy, see the articles Arabian, Aristotelian, Atomical, Cartesian, Corpuscular, Epicurean, Experimental, Hermetical, Leibnitzian, Mechanical, Moral, Natural, Newtonian, Oriental, Platonic, Scholastic, Socratic, . 318 319 320 321 322 323 324 325