STRANGLES

disease of young horses; symptoms—cough, nasal discharge, swelling of lymph glands in throat; treatment—fomentations and tonics; infectious. * STR AS BOURG, tn., cap. of Als a ceL or raine, France (48° 35’ N., 7° 46’ E.), on Ii; first-cla fortre of high strategical importance; R.C. bishop’s see; famous cathedral (1015 onwards) with remarkable astronomical clock, church of St. Thomas (Romanesque and Gothic arch.), library, episc. palace (now museum and art gallery), imperial palace, univ. (founded 1567); reopening of univ. under Fr. rule (1919) by President Poincaré was attended by delegates from chief Fr. and foreign universities. _Housetops frequented by storks. Chief products are machinery, printing, jewelry, hardware, tobacco, pate de foie gras; breweries, tanning, etc. Str as bourg took prominent part in medisval history; annexed by France (1681); severely bombarded (1870); Ceded to Germany (1871) was threat-| ened by French during their occupation of Upper Alsace in early stages of World War; bombed by airmen (1915); finally entered and taken po e ion of by French towards end of Nov. 1918. Pop. 1921, 166,767. in Athens designated the highest magise trate of the state. There were normally ten strategi in Athens, leadership’), primarily a military term, but also applied to the disposition and higher direction of naval power, and (more recently) to air power in war. Strategy is often confounded with Tactics, but, broadly speaking, one may say that the former includes the general direction of a campaign, the higher leadership, while the latter deals with the actual handling of troops on the march, the outpost line, and the field of battle. Strategy has thus its place even in the defense arrangements made by a nation in peace time, for the choice of regions to be fortified, the grouping of troops at their peace stations, the arrangements for mobilization and concentration, are all to be determined by the probable plans for future wars. Strategical principles, the fundamental points on which victory depends, are simple enough; the difficulty arises in their practical application under the stre of actual war. One may briefly indicate the general character of these principles. (1) Victory is the result of bringing a superior force to bear upon an inferior force of the enemy. This does not nece arily mean a more numerous force, for better armament and training and a higher fighting spirit may make the actual striking power of a numerically inferior force superior to that of the enemy. (2) The ‘objective,’ the thing to be aimed at, broken up * and destroyed, is the enemy’s main fighting force. If that is thoroughly beaten nothing else matters; fortre es will surrender, minor forces be easily disposed of, territory will be occupied, and finally the enemy’s will to cone tinue the struggle broken. (3) Di ipation of forces for secondary objects must be avoided, otherwise defeat in the main field of operations is risked. (4) Only the offensive gives decisive results; defensive is temporary Measure adopted while awaiting the opportunity to strike. (5) Against equal or even superior forces superiority at the actual] point where the blow is to be struck can be secured only by concentration on that point, using an inferior force to hold the enemy on the rest of the line b: y delaying tactics, entrenchments,etec, Hence the adv: tage of operating cn | ERs th ce OnE eo Stems ‘interior lines’—(t.e.), With armies holding a smaller arc of front against armies on a wider arc, the former being able to concentrate more rapidly on any given point, and if need be again concentrate on another, thus delivering heavy blows now here now there, and beating the opponent in detail. (6) Modern armies cannot exist for even a few days without a constant renewal of supplies brought from the rear, and often from considerable distances. Their life depends on having a secure and well organized line of supply. If po ible the fighting front should cover this line of supply. If an army has to fight with its supply line running from one of its flanks it may be destroyed or forced to retire by operations against this exposed line; similarly the turning of a flank threatens the line of supply, even if it runs direct to the rear, and thus is a serious strategical and not merely tactical blow. (7) Great armies must have several lines of road at their disposal, to shorten the columns, and march must be so arranged that they ‘march divided and fight united.’ They must also be preceded by a covering force of all arms ‘sufficient to hold an enemy, while the closing up to the front is in progre , and te make that enemy show his hand. The strategic advanced guard holds the enemy while the blow against him is being prepared. (8) Concealment of one’s own operations, knowledge of those of the enemy, so far as it can be ascertained by spies, reconnai ance work, aircraft, etc., are all important. Marshal Foch, one of the great masters of modern war, sums up the principles of leadership as including concentrated action against the enemy’s main army; ‘economy of force’; avoidance of all frittering away of effort on minor objectives, thus enabling the striking force, the ‘ma of operation’, to be got together and husbanded for the decisive blow; the use of the advanced guard (in the sense of all covering detachments) not only for getting touch with the enemy, but for ‘holding’ him so as to make the blow po ible; intelligent obedience and initiative on the part of all subordinate commanders, so that one mind can control the whole; “freedom of action’ for this central command, insured by due measures of protection and reconnai ance, and a Clear grasp of the situation—in a word, security and surene , which he sums up in the one term surete. Naval strategy is directed to securing the ‘command of the sea’ by destroying -{n action, or blockading in its ports, the enemy’s main fleet, and cutting off his oversea supplies while protecting one’s Own sea routes. Here again concentration of force against the main force of the enemy is the key of the whole matter.