CUSTOZZA

BATTLE OF.—Fought Sunday, 24th June, 1866 between the Austrians and Italians. “The Italian army, divided into three corps and a reserve, making up a force of from 80,000 to 90,000 combatants, after cro ing the Mincio at Gotto, and on the other points, on Saturday afternoon, June 23rd, 1866, and sending reconnoitering parties towards Peschiera and Verona, encamped for the night at some place beyond Rover bell a, equidistant from the two fortre es. On the ensuing morning an attempt was made upon those high positions of Sona, Somma Campaign a, and Santa Ciustina, which commands the fifteen miles railway line joining the two strongholds, positions which played a conspicuous part in the campaign of 1848. The object of the Italians was evidently to take po e ion of the railway, so as to isolate Peschiera and secure a basis of operations against Verona. The Austrians, however, who were ma ed in great force at Verona, sallied forth from that place at daybreak, and, anticipating the Italian movements, took up their position upon those hills, which are now everywhere bristling with bastions and redoubts, and may be looked upon as mere outworks of the two citadels, extending from the gates of one to those of the other. After a severe and bloody, or, as the Italians describe it, “desperate struggle,” which lasted nearly the whole day—that longest of summer days—the Imperial army was victorious along the whole line. They stormed the summit of Montevente, where the Italians held out the longest, and at the close of the engagement, at five o’clock in the afternoon, they also carried the position of Custozza, a spot fatal to Italian arms in their encounter with Radetski, in July, 1848. The victors captured several guns, and about 2000 prisoners, and behaved, as the Archduke Albert’s bulletin a ures us, and as we may readily believe, with even more than their ordinary bravery and endurance. On the same evening the Italian army was obliged to re-cro the Mincio. The Italian accounts of the engagement present no points of material difference. According to them, the first army corps was sent forward to occupy some positions between Peschiera and Verona, but being surrounded by superior numbers, it “failed to effect its purpose,” and the description given of its lo es in the contest leaves us little doubt that it was all but annihilated. The second and third corps, unable—it is not said for what reason—to advance to its rescue, were still in the evening “almost intact.” It was also stated from Brescia that the army had maintained its position; but there is little doubt that it had to withdraw acro the Mincio later in the night. The Italians had several of their Generals wounded, among others the King’s second son, Prince A made us, who has arrived at Brescia. There is every probability, also, that the Italians were, on this occasion, outnumbered by their enemies: for the Austrians have from 200,000 to 250,000 men in Venetia, and as they had in their hands the most formidable of all engines of modern warfare—the railway, they had probably ma ed three-fourths, at least, of their troops in Verona, ready for the long-expected Italian inroad. The Archduke’s bulletins, in fact, never speak of garrisons, but tell us that the “imperial army” was in the field. The Italians, we are a ured, behaved with great heroism, and, no doubt although they lost the day, they came off without lo of honour. An advance acro the Mincio, right into the heart of the Quadrilateral, is an enterprise which no other European army would, under such circumstances, have ventured upon, but a frenzy to do something seems to have po e ed the whole Italian nation, and the men in command could think of nothing better than dashing their heads against those formidable stone walls. There may be bravery in so desperate an attempt to take the bull by the horns, but we believe it would be impo ible for the king or La Marmora to say what results they expected from their ill-conceived and worse-executed attempt. It was a battle in which they staked the very existence of their army, while their enemies, in the worst event, ran no other risk than that of a safe and leisurely retreat behind the shelter of their bastions. The least that may be said of it is, that like the Balaklava charge, “ C’était beau mais ce n’était pas la guerre .” Ever since 1848 and 1849 the Austrians have strained every nerve to strengthen these four citadels, and have extended their outworks, so that the line between Peschiera and Verona, especially, is a vast intrenched camp.”