PLATONISM

The philosophy of Plato. To give a satisfactory account of the system of this great thinker, within the limits which the nature of the present work nece arily impose upon us, would be an undertaking of no common difficulty. Those of our readers who are adequately conversant with the original writings of Plato must be well aware that the views entertained in our own country of his philosophical character and merits are, to say the least, partial and incomplete; while those who add to this knowledge an acquaintance with the researches of our German contemporaries on this subject will admit the po ibility, at the same time that they appreciate the difficulty, of attaining a fuller and more adequate comprehension. The leading characteristic of the mind of Plato is its comprehensivene . This quality discovers itself equally in the form in which his philosophy is communicated, and in that philosophy itself. The form to which wc allude is, it is well known, that 937 PL AXON ISM. of the dialogue. The Dialogues of Plato" are at once vivid representations of A then i an life and character, and constituent parts of a system of universal philosophy; the haimonious productions of a genius which combined the dramatic imagination with the scientific intellect in a degree which has never before nor since been equalled. It is in this circumstance that we must seek alike for the influence which Plato's writings have exerted, and for the difficulty of rightly apprehending their meaning. What has been said of history in general may with equal truth be applied to the Platonic dialogues — that they are "philosophy teaching by examples." In place of a formal refutation of sophistry, we are introduced to living sophists; in the room of an elaborate system of l)hilosophy, we meet the greatest philosophers of his day, reasoning and conversing with disciples eager in the pursuit of knowledge, — with A then i ans full of natural prejudices, with men abounding with individual peculiarities. Under no other or le complex form of composition could Plato have accomplished the manifold purposes which he had in view; purposes not of the philosopher only, but of the reformer and educator of the moral and intellectual nature of his countrymen. In most of his dialogues one or other of these intentions is the prominent one; in some the refutation of false philosophy, in others the establishment of his own; while others again seem chiefly designed as exemplifications of scientific method generally; though we agree with Schleiermacher in thinking that there are none which do not contribute to the gradual development of his own system. But it is not merely in the form in which his doctrines are clothed that we discern the comprehensivene of Plato's genius. The same quality is, as we have said, equally apparent in the philosophy of which his dialogues are the vehicle. By referring to the articles Eleat'c, Ionic, and Pythagokean Philosophy, the reader will be able to form some conception of the systems which preceded that of Plato. In each of these some leading idea is taken up, and traced, generally to the exclusion of all others, through all its po ible consequences. These three schools may, indeed, be severally taken as the representatives of the three constituent portions of universal philosophy: the Eleatics of the logical or dialectic; the lonians of the physical; and the Pythagoreans, though in a le exclusive degree, of the ethical element. It was in Plato that these different tendencies first converged. Each viewed by itself was e entially partial and one-sided, and, with whatever of truth it might contain, must nece arily, by its very exclusivene , combine much of error. Of this circumstance the sophists had taken advantage, and, by setting the doctrines of one system in contradiction to those of another, had succeeded in the introduction of a universal scepticism. Plato was thus led clearly to discern the nece ity of laying the foundations of science deeper than they had been laid by his predece ors. The ultimate unity of all knowledge, properly so called, and the mutual dependence of all its parts on each other, is the fundamental intention of his philosophy. How this first principle was to be attained, whether, indeed, it were attainable or not, could only be ascertained by a previous inquiry into the nature.not oi being, but of knowledge. This is one mark which distinguishes Plato from earlier speculators; and it is important to bear it in mind, if we would form a correct estimate of the services rendered by him to the progre of philosophy. The hint was unquestionably given by So crates, but Plato was the only one among his immediate disciples who appears to have followed it up. He may, in truth, be styled the founder of the ancient psychology; and the dialogue entitled Thecetettcs may be considered one of the most important contributions to the most important branch of that science, the theory of perception and judgment, which antiquity affords. It is in this dialogue that the negative side of the inquiry into knowledge, which we have alluded to, is contained. Knowledge, it is there shown, is not to be confounded either with the impre ions on the senses, or with the judgments {ho^ocg) founded upon them. Sensation, by its very nature, is relative only: it is the joint effect of the conditions of our internal constitution and a motion, or change, comnaunicated from without. Judgment, in so far as it is founded on a prior impre ion, can have no validity save in reference to that impre ion. Pure knowledge, therefore, if it exist at all, must be sought in some other direction. It is here that the celebrated doctrine of ideas finds its place. Without entering into the question more deeply than our limits allow, it is sufficiently clear that no other word, such as conception, notion, or the like, is adequate to convey all that Plato meant by an idea. Having failed in finding alike knowledge in the senses and permanent being, its object in nature, he was driven, in order to avoid the sophistic doctrine of the relative nature of all knowledge, to seek for the true objects of reason in something distinct from the material universe. In place of the doctrine of Prot agoras, " Man is the measure of all things," he substituted, " God is the measure of [s. 950]